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I. INTRODUCTION 
John has Asperger’s Syndrome.1 None of his coworkers were aware of it, 
even though a few may have suspected it; what others around him saw was a 
model employee, a highly competent, highly motivated worker who kept calm 
under the most trying of circumstances.2 He sometimes seemed withdrawn and 
often found excuses to avoid office parties, but, by and large, his coworkers 
assumed that he was simply a workaholic.3 
But in December 2012, everything changed for John. On December 14, a 
lone gunman named Adam Lanza killed twenty-six people at an elementary 
school in Connecticut before turning his gun on himself.4 Within hours, as more 
information on Lanza was uncovered, several press reports focused on 
speculation that he might have Asperger’s Syndrome.5 A guest on CNN’s Piers 
 
1. Asperger’s Syndrome is an autistic spectrum disorder characterized by “severe and sustained 
impairment in social interaction . . . and the development of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, 
and activities . . . .” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
80 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. It differs from the diagnosis of autism primarily in that it 
does not feature a delay in early childhood development of language and cognitive skills. Id. Because the 
distinction between Asperger’s Syndrome and autism is unclear and has no practical value to clinicians, the 
DSM-V will merge Asperger’s Syndrome and autism into a single diagnosis called “autism spectrum disorder.” 
Jon Hamilton, Asperger’s Officially Placed Inside Autism Spectrum, NPR (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=123527833 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
2. Although John is fictitious, this is a fairly common profile of people with psychiatric disabilities: many 
go to great lengths to keep peers from becoming aware of their diagnoses. See Susan G. Goldberg et al., The 
Disclosure Conundrum: How People with Psychiatric Disabilities Navigate Employment, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 463, 479 (2005) (describing challenges to which people with psychiatric disabilities are willing to 
face to avoid disclosing their disabilities). People with Asperger’s Syndrome are often able to mask the effects 
of the disorder: “for example, the individual may learn to apply explicit verbal rules or routines in certain 
stressful situations. . . . [A]s adults, many individuals are capable of gainful employment and personal self-
sufficiency.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 1, at 82. 
3. This, too, is fairly common for people with psychiatric disabilities: one recent study of high-
functioning people with schizophrenia found that working is a common coping mechanism. Elyn Saks, 
Successful and Schizophrenic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/opinion/ 
sunday/schizophrenic-not-stupid.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). One respondent in a study 
“works on the weekends too because of ‘the distraction factor.’ In other words, by engaging in work, the crazy 
stuff often recedes to the sidelines.” Id. 
4. Tracy Connor & Pete Williams, Newtown Gunman Forced His Way into School, Police Say, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/15/15926718-newtown-gunman-forced-his-
way-into-school-police-say (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
5. E.g., David M. Halbfinger, A Gunman, Recalled as Intelligent and Shy, Who Left Few Footprints in 
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/adam-lanza-an-enigma-who-
is-now-identified-as-a-mass-killer.html (reporting that several of Lanza’s high-school classmates “had been 
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Morgan Tonight suggested that people with autism spectrum disorders6 might be 
more prone to violence because they lacked a “capacity for empathy.”7 Even 
family members of people with autism spectrum disorders expressed fear that 
their children might become mass murderers.8 Although mental health 
professionals and advocates for people with autism spectrum disorders quickly 
pushed back against negative media portrayals of Asperger’s Syndrome,9 the 
damage had been done where John was concerned. Later that week, one of 
John’s coworkers, who had viewed Piers Morgan Tonight after the Connecticut 
mass shooting, began to suspect that John might have an autism spectrum 
disorder and told a supervisor that John might fit Adam Lanza’s profile. John was 
fired the next day and was told that he was being removed from the workplace 
because he was a danger to himself and everyone around him. 
John was well-informed enough to file a charge of disability discrimination 
with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). The EEOC 
investigated his charge and found that there were indeed facts suggesting that he 
had been fired, at least in part, because of his mental illness. His employer 
refused to negotiate a settlement, however, and lacking the resources to file a 
lawsuit, the EEOC instead issued John a right-to-sue notice. 
John retained an attorney shortly thereafter. The attorney advised him that, 
although he had a strong case for disability discrimination under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA),10 his remedies would likely be limited to 
reinstatement and back pay.11 Although it is true that intentional discrimination 
 
told” that he had Asperger’s Syndrome and that law enforcement officials “were closely examining whether Mr. 
Lanza had such a disorder”) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
6. See supra note 1 (defining autism spectrum disorder). 
7. Tommy Christopher, Piers Morgan Quack Says People With Autism Lack Empathy: ‘Something’s 
Missing In The Brain’, MEDIAITE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/piers-morgan-quack-says-
people-with-autism-lack-empathy-somethings-missing-in-the-brain/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
This was not the first time in 2012 that autism spectrum disorders had been associated with violence by 
television commentators. MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough had previously responded to a mass shooting in Aurora, 
Colorado by suggesting that mass shooters tended to be “somewhere, I believe, on the autism scale.” Dylan 
Byers, Scarborough: Holmes ‘On Autism Scale’, POLITICO (July 23, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ 
media/2012/07/scarborough-holmes-on-autism-scale-129779.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
8. E.g., Liza Long, Thinking the Unthinkable, THE ANARCHIST SOCCER MOM (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://anarchistsoccermom.blogspot.com/2012/12/thinking-unthinkable.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); 
Pamela Mirghani, My Brother Is Not Adam Lanza, But He Could Be, W. AUSTL. TODAY (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www.watoday.com.au/opinion/my-brother-is-not-adam-lanza-but-he-could-be-20121221-2bql1.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
9. E.g., Adam Martin, Asperger’s Is a Red Herring to Explain the Newtown Massacre, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 16, 
2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/12/aspergers-is-a-red-herring-to-explain-newtown.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
10. See infra Part II.B (discussing an employer’s affirmative duties in evaluating a direct threat to the 
health or safety of the workplace). John’s employer, by failing to evaluate whether his disability actually created 
significant danger in the workplace, clearly breached that duty. Id. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (listing equitable remedies for employment discrimination); see infra 
Part III (discussing remedies actually received by prevailing disability discrimination plaintiffs with psychiatric 
disabilities). 
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on the basis of disability carries compensatory and possibly punitive damages,12 
proving intent would be difficult.13 John’s supervisor did not actually know that 
John had Asperger’s Syndrome, but had simply acted hastily, and arguably 
negligently, on a report that John’s behavior might have had parallels to Adam 
Lanza’s behavior prior to December 14.14 
At this point, John faced a serious dilemma. His employer refused to 
negotiate a settlement, and litigation seemed like a poor option even if he was 
almost certain to prevail. John knew that, should he file suit, his diagnosis would 
become public knowledge. Where his supervisor and a few coworkers may have 
been aware of his Asperger’s Syndrome at the time he was fired, his entire 
workplace would be aware if he were to be reinstated. Unable to accept that 
possibility, John declined to file a civil complaint. Much like his namesake, the 
protagonist of Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, John found himself in a situation where 
the act of seeking a remedy would defeat the remedy itself.15 
People with psychiatric disabilities have reported experiencing worse 
discrimination in the workplace than in any other context.16 Although John’s 
story is fictitious, several commentators have discussed the scenario in which an 
employee with a psychiatric condition is fired on the grounds of allegedly 
endangering others in the workplace.17 Studies have repeatedly found that large 
portions of the public greatly fear individuals with psychiatric conditions and 
believe that people with psychiatric conditions are likely to commit violent acts, 
regardless of the specific diagnosis.18 Even as American society has generally 
become more accepting of differences, the stereotype of the dangerous 
psychiatric patient appears to have actually increased over recent decades.19 
 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 
13. See infra Part III.B (discussing reasons why plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities have difficulty 
proving discriminatory intent). 
14. Particularly when a plaintiff’s disability is psychiatric, courts are often reluctant to determine that 
discrimination is intentional for a variety of reasons. See infra Part III.B. 
15.  John Yossarian, the novel’s protagonist, tries to escape World War II by asking his bomber 
squadron’s doctor about the possibility of being grounded for insanity, only to discover that asking to be 
grounded would prevent him from being grounded: 
Orr [another pilot] was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he 
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly 
more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was 
crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very 
deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.  
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 46 (Simon & Schuster, 1st paperback ed., 2004) (1961). 
16.  SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES 4 (2001). 
17.  E.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 609–12 
(2003) (discussing the fear that a mentally ill person may become violent as a driving force behind workplace 
discrimination); Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the ‘Dangerous Mentally Ill’, 34 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 849 (2001). 
18.  Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at 
the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 52 (2005). 
19.  Id. 
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Because proclivity for violence is the dominant stereotype, fear of violence is 
probably the most common cause of employment discrimination against people 
with psychiatric disabilities.20 
Courts have recognized that federal disability discrimination statutes are 
intended to dispel myths about people with disabilities.21 However, despite that 
stated goal, people with psychiatric disabilities continue to face a very real 
“justice disparity” as compared to people with other disabilities.22 One study 
found those with psychiatric disabilities experience less favorable litigation 
outcomes, lower levels of satisfaction with the process of enforcement, and 
reduced access to settlement negotiations and alternative dispute resolution, none 
of which were entirely attributable to the relative merit of the cases brought.23 
Most of the scholarship on the difficulties faced by plaintiffs with psychiatric 
disabilities has focused on the definition of disability.24 This focus was 
historically well justified: psychiatric disability discrimination actions most 
commonly failed at summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to prove 
membership in the protected class under the ADA.25 The case law greatly 
narrowed the definition of disability for both physical and mental disabilities 
 
20.  See Jean Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA: Unintended 
Consequences for Employment of People with Mental Health Disabilities, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK 
DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 221, 228 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997) (discussing employer 
attitudes toward psychiatric disabilities). Surveys of employers support the same conclusion. One study found 
that employers were more reluctant to hire applicants with a history of psychiatric illness than any of a list of 
other factors, including ethnic minority status, physical disability, and even having a criminal record. Id. at 228–
29 (citing James N. Colbert et al., Two Psychological Portals of Entry for Disadvantaged Groups, 34 
REHABILITATION LITERATURE 194 (1973)). Another found that the fear of violence was the highest-rated 
concern of employers in hiring people with psychiatric illnesses. Id. at 228; see also Edward Diksa & E. Sally 
Rogers, Employer Concerns about Hiring Persons with Psychiatric Disability: Results of the Employer Attitude 
Questionnaire, 40 REHABILITATION COUNSELING BULL. 31 (1996) (finding a similar result six years later). 
21.  E.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1987) (describing the “basic 
purpose” of the Rehabilitation Act as “to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other 
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.”). 
22.  Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat People with 
Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REV. 94 (2006). Swanson and his co-authors used empirical data to 
test the hypothesis that the legal system might in some way treat people with psychiatric disabilities differently 
from those with other disabilities. See id. They observe that “a justice disparity for people with psychiatric 
disabilities would not be unique,” citing the long, continuing struggle to combat “persistent perceptions of 
racial, ethnic, and gender bias in the administration of justice.” Id. at 136. 
23.  Id. at 139. 
24. See, e.g.,  Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There Is Nothing Left for 
Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
721 (2004); Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A Proposal to 
Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321 (2003); Randal I. Goldstein, 
Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (2001).  
25.  See Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 327 (“[H]ostile court rulings frequently turn on whether the 
individual is ‘substantially limited.’”); Goldstein, supra note 24, at 950 (citing cases in which courts rejected 
psychiatric disability discrimination claims because “medications and counseling allow [the plaintiffs] to 
function without limitation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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from Congress’s intended definition,26 requiring that a plaintiff have a condition 
that “prevents or severely restricts” an activity “of central importance to most 
people’s daily lives”27 and that the condition be considered in its mitigated state.28 
The restricted definition of disability had a disproportionate effect on 
psychiatric disability plaintiffs because the ADA specifically protects “qualified” 
individuals with disabilities.29 Because people with psychiatric illnesses are, by 
definition, impaired in cognitive function, their disability directly impacts their 
qualifications for many jobs. The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the statute as requiring severe and pervasive limitation despite mitigation 
excluded individuals who had well-controlled mental illness.30 Although 
appropriate mental healthcare might make a plaintiff able to perform job duties, 
any plaintiff who could prove that he or she was thus qualified for a job would 
then have difficulty proving the existence of a protected disability.31 
In 2008, in response to the judicial narrowing of the definition of 
“disability,” Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), greatly 
expanding the scope of the term.32 In its findings, Congress expressly repudiated 
court decisions that had narrowed the definition of “disability.”33 
With the passage of the ADAAA, many more ADA plaintiffs are now able to 
pass the threshold test of establishing membership in the protected class. Prior to 
the ADAAA, both the case law and the scholarship concerning the ADA focused 
overwhelmingly on that threshold test because few plaintiffs had the opportunity 
to litigate any other issue.34 Today, however, as litigation of other aspects of the 
ADA becomes more frequent, they deserve further scrutiny.35 As exemplified in 
John’s predicament, the remedies available under the ADA are often insufficient 
to overcome the additional disincentives against enforcement faced by employees 
 
26. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (2008) 
(expressly stating the intent to define “disability” broadly). 
27.  Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
28.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487. 
29.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009). 
30.  Parikh, supra note 24, at 740–41  (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488). 
31.  Id. at 741; see also Goldstein, supra note 24, at 944–45 (further discussing essential job functions that 
are impaired by an untreated mental illness, leading courts to declare that plaintiffs are “not otherwise 
qualified”). 
32.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
33.  Id. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553–54. The amended statute requires that disabilities be considered in their 
unmitigated state, that disabilities that are “episodic or in remission” should be considered in their active state, 
and that the ADA should generally be interpreted as having broad coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. II 
2009). 
34.  See Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 
188 (2010) (“Although courts encountered these interpretive questions prior to the ADAAA, they have not yet 
fully resolved these issues due to the scarcity of ADA cases that proceeded past the initial question of the 
plaintiff’s standing to sue.”). 
35.  Id. at 188–89. 
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with invisible and highly stigmatized disabilities, such as mental illness.36 These 
disincentives against litigation cause rational employers to refuse to settle 
disputes out of court, in turn leaving employees litigation as the sole avenue for 
obtaining relief.37 This Comment argues that a consistently available 
compensatory damages remedy is necessary to provide meaningful protection for 
both the employment rights and privacy of employees with psychiatric 
disabilities, and proposes a solution in the use of common-law causes of action. 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the ADA and its remedies 
for employment discrimination. Part III discusses the characteristics of 
psychiatric disabilities and how they affect ADA causes of action and remedies. 
Part IV considers the question of why alternative dispute resolution has been 
underutilized in psychiatric disability cases, focusing on the EEOC voluntary 
mediation program. It then argues that effective remedies are necessary to 
encourage employers to negotiate in good faith and agree to mediation or other 
forms of settlement. Part V is a multi-part proposal to provide disability 
discrimination plaintiffs who have psychiatric disabilities with meaningful 
remedies and to encourage defendants to negotiate settlements in good faith. It 
explores the use of the characteristics of psychiatric disabilities to sustain 
common-law claims as a means of creating the necessary incentives to enforce 
the ADA. It examines several specific tort claims that may be particularly viable 
for psychiatric disability discrimination: negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge 
against public policy.  It also examines the remedy of front pay as an option, and 
proposes policy changes to promote mediation. 
II. THE ADA’S EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the main federal statute 
protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination.38 This Par5t will provide 
background information on the ADA. It will discuss the general statutory 
framework,39 the direct threat exception that frequently comes into play in 
psychiatric disability discrimination cases,40 remedies available under the ADA,41 
 
36.  See infra Part III (discussing the insufficiency of the ADA’s remedial structure for people with 
psychiatric disabilities). 
37.  See infra Part IV.B (discussing reasons for employer refusal to engage in alternative dispute 
resolution). 
38. 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2006); John Parry, Civil Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony 
41 (2010). 
39. See infra Part II.A. 
40. See infra Part II.B. 
41. See infra Part II.C.-D. 
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and recent legislation that  may bring questions about ADA remedies to the 
forefront of litigation.42 
A. The Statutory Framework 
Title I of the ADA, the portion concerning employment discrimination, 
applies broadly to employers with fifteen or more employees, with the exception 
of the federal government, corporations wholly owned by the federal 
government, and Indian tribes.43 Employers subject to the ADA are prohibited 
from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment.”44 The protected class of employees includes 
persons with “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities,” persons with “a record of” or “regarded as having” 
such an impairment,45 and persons who have a known “relationship or 
association” with an individual with a disability.46 
The ADA differs from other civil rights statutes in that it places an 
affirmative duty on employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s 
disability.47 This requirement is closely related to the ADA’s criterion of 
“qualified” in defining the protected class: a “qualified person” is one who can 
perform all essential job functions with accommodations that are reasonable in 
extent.48 The employer has an affirmative duty to make a reasonable effort to 
determine such an accommodation through an “interactive process” with the 
employee with a disability.49 
 
42. See infra Part II.E. 
43.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits employment discrimination by 
the federal government and by organizations receiving federal grants or contracts. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793–794 
(2006). The Rehabilitation Act defines “disability” somewhat differently from the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). 
However, because the Rehabilitation Act has been amended to incorporate the ADA’s standards of proof for 
employment discrimination, id. §§ 791(g), 793(e), 794(d), and both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 
incorporate by reference the remedies of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Comment’s analysis of ADA 
remedies applies to Rehabilitation Act actions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 794a(a), 12117(a). 
44.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
45.  Id. § 12102(1). 
46.  Id. § 12112(b)(4). 
47.  Id. § 12112(b)(5). 
48.  Id. § 12111(8). 
49.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2012). Although the regulation uses the words “may be necessary,” rather 
than mandatory terms, courts have consistently held that the interactive process is mandatory. Kleiber v. Honda 
of America Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing numerous cases from other circuits). 
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B. The Direct Threat Exception 
The ADA contains an exception that is particularly relevant in psychiatric 
disability cases: an individual who poses “a direct threat to the health or safety of 
other individuals in the workplace” is excluded from the protected class.50 
The direct threat provision demands an individualized assessment of risk that 
considers both the specific circumstances and whether the risk can be mitigated 
by reasonable accommodations.51 The assessment must be entirely objective52 and 
“based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical 
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”53 In School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting a similar 
direct threat provision in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as applied to a 
schoolteacher discharged on the basis of a diagnosis of tuberculosis, stated that 
“[t]he Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or 
perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound 
judgments . . . .”54 When Congress enacted the ADA, numerous congressional 
committees expressed the intent that the Arline standard should be applied to the 
direct threat provision in the ADA;55 the Supreme Court later applied that 
standard to ADA direct threat analysis in Bragdon v. Abbott.56 In holding that a 
dentist’s refusal to treat an HIV-positive patient in his office due to a perceived 
risk of transmission violated the ADA, the Court emphasized that a risk must be 
significant,57 and not merely speculative,58 to constitute a direct threat. 
Because existence of a direct threat is an affirmative defense, the employer 
has the burden of proving that it found the employee to pose a direct threat 
through an objective, individualized inquiry complying with the Arline 
 
50.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). 
51.  Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). Although this case was decided before the 
enactment of the ADA, the “direct threat” provision in the Rehabilitation Act that the Court interpreted was 
substantially similar to that found in the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (2006) (excluding individuals who 
“would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals”). The ADA also expressly defines 
“direct threat” as including only “significant risk” that “cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). 
52.  Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Such an analysis . . . disallows 
reliance on subjective evaluations . . . .”). 
53.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the opinions of physicians outside the specialty associated with the employee’s disability are 
insufficient to establish that an employer has made the required direct threat assessment). 
54.  480 U.S. at 284–85. 
55.  Hubbard, supra note 17, at 862, 862 n.44. 
56.  524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998). 
57.  Id. (“Because few, if any, activities in life are risk free, Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a risk 
exists, but whether it is significant.”). 
58.  Id. at 653 (observing that the petitioner’s assertion that dentists risked contracting HIV from patients 
was based only on “the absence of contrary evidence, not on positive data.”). 
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standard.59 In the specific context of psychiatric disabilities, the employer’s 
individualized inquiry must identify specific behavior on the part of the 
employee that would create a direct threat.60 
C. ADA Causes of Action and Remedies 
As with other antidiscrimination statutes, plaintiffs may sue under a theory of 
disparate treatment or disparate impact.61 In addition, a third cause of action 
exists for failure to accommodate a disability.62 
Disparate treatment, as its plain-language meaning suggests, occurs when a 
plaintiff is treated differently from others similarly situated “because of, not 
merely in spite of,” membership in an identifiable protected class.63 The plaintiff 
must prove the defendant’s subjective discriminatory intent; in most civil rights 
contexts, the terms “disparate treatment” and “intentional discrimination” are 
used interchangeably.64 
Discrimination need not be intentional to be unlawful, however. Since 1971, 
the courts have recognized that antidiscrimination statutes prohibit “practices that 
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” a theory that has come to be 
known as disparate impact.65 Although the disparate impact theory was created 
judicially in the general antidiscrimination paradigm, it is expressly codified in 
Title I of the ADA.66 The ADA prohibits employment policies or practices that 
“have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability,”67 and also prohibits 
“qualification standards . . . that screen out or tend to screen out” individuals with 
disabilities unless the standard is “job-related for the position in question” and 
“consistent with business necessity.”68 
Failure to accommodate occurs when an employer denies the employee a 
reasonable accommodation or denies an employment opportunity to avoid the 
 
59.  Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999). This interpretation is reflected 
in the EEOC’s interpretive guidance. 29 C.F.R. 1630, App. § 1630.15(b)–(c) (2012) (“[A]n employer must 
demonstrate that the requirement, applied to the individual, satisfies the direct threat standard in § 
1630.2(r) . . . .”). However, at least one other circuit has contested this interpretation. Hubbard, supra note 17, at 
865, 865 n.52 (citing Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
60.  Hubbard, supra note 17, at 864–65 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 57 (1990)). 
61. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003). 
62.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006). 
63.  Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64.  Statutory language implies the same, defining “intentional discrimination” as unlawful discrimination 
that is “not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). 
65.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6). 
67.  Id. § 12112(b)(3). 
68.  Id. § 12112(b)(6). 
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duty to provide an accommodation.69 An employer is not liable when 
accommodating the employee’s disability would cause “undue hardship.”70 
The ADA incorporates by reference the remedies listed in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.71 This creates a three-tiered system of remedies in employment 
cases: equitable relief in all cases,72 compensatory damages for intentional 
discrimination,73 and punitive damages only when the defendant acted 
maliciously or with “reckless indifference” to the plaintiff’s federally protected 
rights.74 Compensatory damages are capped at a level determined by the 
employer’s size.75 Where the plaintiff’s cause of action is failure to accommodate 
a disability, compensatory damages are awarded only where the employer acts in 
bad faith.76 
Equitable relief typically consists of injunctive relief and any back pay the 
employer owes.77 Pursuant to statute, back pay is considered an equitable remedy 
rather than an element of compensatory damages.78 In addition, a prevailing 
plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees.79 
D. Administrative Procedure 
Like other employment discrimination plaintiffs, ADA Title I plaintiffs must 
exhaust administrative remedies.80 A person alleging disability discrimination 
must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC or one of its state or local 
counterparts.81 The EEOC may bring a civil action or attempt to negotiate a 
 
69.  Id. § 12112(b)(5). 
70.  Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Whether an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” is a question of fact, 
depending on factors including the nature and cost of the accommodation, the effect of accommodation on the 
employee’s work site, the employer’s financial resources, and the types of operations in which the employer is 
engaged. Id. § 12111(10). 
71.  Id. § 12117(a). 
72.  Id. § 2000e-5(g). The equitable relief to which plaintiffs are entitled “may include, but is not limited 
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay” as well as an injunction against the unlawful 
employment practice alleged in the complaint. Id. 
73.  Id. § 1981a(a)(2). 
74.  Id. § 1981a(b)(1). An employer acts with reckless indifference when discriminating “in the face of a 
perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law . . . .” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 
(1999). 
75.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
76.  Id. § 1981a(a)(3). 
77. Id. § 2000e-5(g).  
78.  Id. §§ 1981a(b)(2), 2000e-5(g)(1). 
79.  Id. § 2000e-5(k). 
80.  SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN 
FEDERAL COURT 42 (2005). 
81.  Id. 
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settlement on the claimant’s behalf.82 The person alleging discrimination may 
only file a private lawsuit if the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice.83 
Despite the existence of an administrative enforcement mechanism, private 
lawsuits remain a critical component of enforcing the ADA.84 “Civil rights laws 
depend on the private bar for their enforcement. Government enforcers have 
limited resources in the best of times . . . . Public interest groups, moreover, have 
far too limited resources to fill in the gap . . . .”85 Because the EEOC only has the 
resources to sue employers in a fraction of the potentially meritorious disability 
discrimination claims received each year, it tends to focus its attention on cases 
that appear strongest or have high precedential value.86 In addition, critics have 
noted that the EEOC and other executive agencies often decline to litigate 
“legally sound but politically touchy enforcement actions.”87 Because of its 
limited resources, the EEOC issues right-to-sue letters in the vast majority of 
apparently meritorious cases, leaving enforcement to private litigants.88 
E. The ADA Amendments Act: Changing the Face of ADA Litigation 
For many years, a great majority of ADA Title I plaintiffs failed to establish 
a prima facie case specifically because they were unable to prove membership in 
 
82.  29 C.F.R. §§1601.24, 1601.27 (2012). 
83.  Id. § 1601.28. 
84.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA 
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 35 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Limited Remedies]; see also MEZEY, supra 
note 80, at 172 (describing a general consensus among disability rights advocates that the threat of litigation has 
been the main driver of ADA compliance). 
85.  Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 35. 
86.  Claims that the EEOC fully investigates and litigates tend to “involve pattern or practice/systemic 
issues or other public policy concerns that call for public adjudication.” Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to 
Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant Is Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of 
Unconscious Disparate Treatment and Unjustified Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225, 
257 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). In addition, “the easiest cases resolve at the EEOC level.” Michael E. 
Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2012). 
87.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1459, 
1461 (2007). 
88.  See Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2013) (listing numbers of ADA charges filed from 1997 through 2012 and breaking them down 
by type of resolution) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). In 2010, the EEOC found 1,186 ADA claims to 
have reasonable cause at the conclusion of investigation; in 747 of these it was unable to reach a settlement with 
the employer. Id. In that year, it filed forty-one ADA suits, which represents just one-in-eighteen of the 
unresolved claims it found to have merit. EEOC Litigation Statistics, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). Private litigation has been the primary means of enforcement of antidiscrimination 
statutes since they were first enacted; between 1972 and 1989 the EEOC filed less than four percent of 
employment discrimination lawsuits. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1000 n.66 (1991). 
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the protected class of qualified individuals with disabilities.89 Courts tended to 
construe the definition of “disability” extremely narrowly on several different 
grounds. First, in Sutton v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court held that two 
pilots denied employment for having severe myopia were not disabled because 
they had normal or better eyesight with corrective lenses.90 Its holding required 
courts to consider a disability in its mitigated state, which created particular 
difficulties for individuals with well-controlled psychiatric disabilities who might 
nevertheless face discrimination in the workplace.91 Second, courts often found 
that a psychiatric illness did not constitute a disability under the ADA because it 
did not limit “a major life activity.”92 Third, some courts read the words 
“substantially limit” as requiring that the putative disability have a pervasive, 
long-term impact, which excludes many psychiatric illnesses that affect patients 
episodically.93 Finally, the Sutton Court construed the “regarded as” prong of the 
disability definition so narrowly as to eliminate virtually all claims relying on 
that prong, by holding that people who were regarded as limited, but not regarded 
as “substantially limited,” were not protected.94 
In 2008, Congress overruled these judicial precedents by enacting the ADA 
Amendments Act.95 The ADAAA expanded the definition of “disability” by 
inserting language expressly stating that disabilities are to be considered in their 
unmitigated state, stating that conditions that were “episodic or in remission” are 
to be considered in their active state, and codifying broad readings of 
“substantially limits” and “major life activity.”96 It clarified that an individual is 
“regarded as” disabled if he or she is regarded as having any impairment 
“whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.”97 In its findings, Congress listed its disapproval of Sutton and other 
cases limiting the definition of “disability” among its reasons for amending the 
ADA.98 
 
89.  Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 325–26. 
90.  527 U.S. 471, 482–83, 487 (1999). 
91.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 36. Numerous courts subsequently used exactly this reasoning to determine 
that psychiatric disabilities that were controlled by medication were not disabilities under the ADA. Id. at 37; 
Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 122–23. 
92.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 74–75; Korn, supra note 17, at 641–42; see, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson 
Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the impairment of plaintiff’s everyday 
mobility by panic disorder did not limit a major life activity because it did not prevent the plaintiff from 
commuting to work); Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Minn. 1997) (holding that 
“inability to get along with others” is not a “major life activity”). 
93. See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment for 
defendant because plaintiff had not shown “that he had a continuing inability to handle stress at all times, rather 
than only episodically”). 
94.  Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 326 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490–91). 
95.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
96.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. II 2009). 
97.  Id. § 12102(3)(A). 
98.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (2008). 
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Prior to the ADAAA, very little of the extant ADA case law and scholarship 
concerned issues other than the definition of disability because few cases 
proceeded beyond the threshold question of the plaintiff’s membership in the 
protected class.99 By expanding the definition of disability, the ADAAA 
increased the likelihood that a disability discrimination case could proceed 
beyond that initial stage of analysis.100 It is for this reason that this Comment 
focuses on remedies. 
III. ADA ENFORCEMENT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 
Empirically, enforcing the ADA has been particularly difficult for plaintiffs 
with psychiatric disabilities.101 Why is this the case? 
This Part first discusses the characteristics that differentiate psychiatric 
disabilities from other disabilities,102 then explores three ways in which these 
differences affect ADA enforcement: (1) plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities 
face greater difficulty proving discriminatory intent;103 (2) the equitable relief that 
is available without proof of intentional discrimination is particularly ineffective 
for employees with psychiatric disabilities;104 (3) and concerns about privacy, 
along with other aspects of psychiatric illnesses, deter victims of psychiatric 
disability discrimination from seeking relief.105 
A. What Makes Psychiatric Disabilities Different? 
The stereotypes surrounding psychiatric disabilities differ from those relating 
to other forms of disability.106 Whereas attitudes about other disabilities tend 
toward either paternalism or doubt about an individual’s productivity, people 
with psychiatric disabilities are more often viewed with fear and seen as a danger 
to those around them.107 Media portrayals of people with psychiatric disabilities 
as prone to violence feed this stereotype.108 Where employers might view a 
 
99.  See Cox, supra note 34, at 188 (“Although courts encountered these interpretive questions prior to the 
ADAAA, they have not yet fully resolved these issues due to the scarcity of ADA cases that proceeded past the 
initial question of the plaintiff’s standing to sue.”). 
100.  Id. at 188–89. 
101.  Swanson et al., supra note 22. 
102.  See infra Part III.A. 
103.  See infra Part III.B. 
104.  See infra Part III.C. 
105.  See infra Part III.D. 
106.  Hubbard, supra note 17, at 850. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Korn, supra note 17, at 608 (observing that news articles about violent crimes often cite the alleged 
criminal’s history of mental illness and that most film and television characters with mental illness are portrayed 
as violent). 
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person with a “physical” disability as incurring an acceptable economic burden,109 
they might view a person with a psychiatric disability as posing a non-
quantifiable, unacceptable risk.110 
Psychiatric disabilities are manifested primarily in behavior.111 For this 
reason, they are particularly susceptible to facially neutral workplace rules or 
policies that have a disproportionate impact on—and may even be devised to 
remove—people with psychiatric disabilities.112 Particularly common are 
violence-prevention measures that involve behavioral profiling.113 At other times, 
workplace policies may err far on the side of removing perceived safety risks, 
even when the degree of risk is remote or nonexistent.114 Some people who have 
disclosed psychiatric disabilities to their employers report that they are held to 
higher behavioral standards than non-disabled coworkers; emotional reactions 
that would otherwise pass without remark are seen as signs that the person is 
losing control.115 
On the other hand, psychiatric disabilities are also often invisible unless 
disclosed.116 Symptoms may not be readily apparent in the workplace because 
they are well-managed or the person with the disability “self-accommodates” to 
 
109.  See generally SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 59–60, 67–68 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS] (discussing the 
prohibition on statistically-based “rational discrimination” and characterizing the ADA’s accommodation 
mandate as imposing acceptable costs on employers). 
110.  See Hensel & Jones, supra note 18, at 71 (citing OTTO F. WAHL, TELLING IS RISKY BUSINESS: 
MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS CONFRONT STIGMA 84–85 (1999)) (“60% of personnel directors ‘would never 
choose an individual with mental illness for an executive job,’ compared with just 3% who would not hire a 
person with diabetes.”); see also Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 228–29 (citing Colbert et al., supra 
note 20) (finding that employers viewed “mental instability” more negatively than a variety of other 
characteristics, including physical disability and even time spent in prison). 
111.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 154. 
112.  See id. at 155 (“These seemingly neutral rules may be devised precisely to ensure the removal of 
employees . . . who are not in the least threatening, but whose disability-related behavior nevertheless makes 
fellow employees uncomfortable.”). The courts have recognized that the strict application of such rules may 
constitute disparate impact discrimination. See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 
1997) (observing that some accommodation for disability-caused conduct is necessary because not doing so 
would render the ADA meaningless for disabilities that manifest themselves behaviorally). 
113.  Korn, supra note 17, at 614–15. The degree to which behavioral profiling is socially accepted might 
best be demonstrated by one advertisement for a 1995 seminar that promised to teach employers how to “avoid 
hiring lemons, nuts and flakes.” Hubbard, supra note 17, at 903 n.218. 
114.  In employment discrimination cases, behavior cited by the employer as “misconduct” has ranged 
from actual threats or sexual harassment to mere eccentric behavior. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 153–54. Some 
institutions have implemented policies broadly prohibiting conduct that merely creates a perception of danger. 
See, e.g., CECIL CNTY. GOV’T, PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 62 (rev. 2011), available at 
www.ccgov.org/uploads/HR/P_PManual2011.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (prohibiting 
“behavior that creates a fear of injury to another person”). Employers, courts, and regulators alike often share a 
“zero-risk mentality that leads people to demand an elimination of all risk.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1494–95, 1506 (2001). 
115.  Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 232. 
116.  Id. at 229. 
_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014  9:42 AM 
2013 / The Catch-22 of ADA Title I Remedies for Psychiatric Disabilities 
1004 
perform the functions of the job.117 Employers typically see the symptoms only in 
the form of “common personality traits” such as “the inability to tolerate stress, 
difficulties with interpersonal and social relationships, and periodic difficulties in 
focusing and concentration.”118 Even where the disability manifests itself as 
unusual conduct, it is often not readily apparent that such conduct is the result of 
a psychiatric disability.119 
Because psychiatric disabilities tend to be invisible, the stigma surrounding 
them has been particularly difficult to dispel.120 Civil rights laws have been more 
effective in destigmatizing other marginalized groups through contact in 
workplaces and other public venues.121 But the contact theory may not work 
similarly for psychiatric and other invisible disabilities; coworkers are not 
exposed to people with disabilities as long as the disability remains undisclosed, 
and disclosure itself has been known to stigmatize individuals.122 Although 
advocacy groups have made significant progress in increasing the public’s 
understanding of psychiatric disabilities, these efforts tend to operate at a 
conscious level and have not necessarily altered unconscious stereotypes.123 As a 
result, the public continues to view psychiatric disabilities as somehow more 
worthy of fear and less deserving of accommodation than other disabilities.124 
B. Problems with Discriminatory Intent 
Empirically, prevailing plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are less likely 
to be awarded monetary damages than prevailing plaintiffs with other types of 
 
117. Id. at 230. Campbell and Kaufmann quote several employees with disabilities who make this 
observation. Id. “I’m accommodating all the time, but they don’t know or realize it,” one said. Id. Another 
experienced psychotic symptoms that others in the workplace noticed only in the form of the resulting fatigue. 
Id. 
118.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 63. 
119.  See id. at 153–54 (describing examples of alleged employee “misconduct” seen in disability 
discrimination cases, most of which would not automatically create the impression of a psychiatric disability); 
Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 223 (observing that psychiatric disabilities “manifest themselves 
through behavior that may appear to be voluntary”). 
120.  Goldberg et al., supra note 2, at 494. 
121.  Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1351, 
1366 (2008). But see BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 2 (noting the “inherent 
limitations of antidiscrimination laws” in combating social stigma). 
122.  Goldberg et al., supra note 2, at 494; see also Nancy Hall, Mental Illness + Workplace Violence, 13 
VISIONS: BC’S MENTAL HEALTH J. 7 (Fall/Winter 2001) (citing a Canadian study that found that eight in ten 
workers report discrimination following disclosure of a psychiatric disability). 
123.  See Sadie F. Dingfelder, Stigma: Alive and Well, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 56 (2006), available at 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/stigma.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing that most 
anti-stigma campaigns “convey the message that mental illness is a disease like any other” and “focus on the 
prevalence and symptoms of mental illness”). 
124.  This is even true of behavioral manifestations of disabilities. See Korn, supra note 17, at 607–08 
(observing that the public tends to be more understanding with, and that employers are more likely to 
accommodate, behavioral changes that are associated with “physical” disabilities). 
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disabilities.125 Because an award of compensatory damages requires 
discriminatory intent, 126 the higher frequency at which plaintiffs with psychiatric 
disabilities receive purely equitable remedies suggests that courts are less likely 
to find intent even when they find that some form of unlawful discrimination 
occurred. 
The prima facie case for proof of intentional discrimination, articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green,127 applies to disparate treatment claims under the 
ADA.128 Historically, disability discrimination plaintiffs most often failed to make 
a prima facie case because they could not prove the necessary element of 
membership in the ADA’s protected class.129 With the passage of the ADAAA, 
which greatly explanded the protected class by defining disability more broadly, 
more plaintiffs are able to survive summary judgment.130 Still, after both sides 
have met their burdens of production, the plaintiff retains the burden of proving 
discriminatory intent.131 This is true whether the plaintiff chooses to attack the 
defendant’s proffered reason as pretext or to attempt to prove mixed motive.132 
In practice, “intentional discrimination” has been narrowly defined, with 
lower courts sometimes incorrectly requiring some evidence of active dislike or 
ill-will toward the plaintiff’s class.133 This misunderstanding of intent may 
particularly disadvantage plaintiffs with disabilities, as society greatly 
underestimates the prevalence of animus toward persons with disabilities.134 The 
 
125.  Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 108. 
126.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). 
127.  411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
128.  E.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to 
determine burdens of production in an ADA claim). 
129.  Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 325–26. 
130. Cox, supra note 34, at 188–89. 
131.  Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981) (holding that the defendant’s 
production of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason rebuts the plaintiff’s prima facie case, and the plaintiff’s 
burden to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the 
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”). 
132.  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003) (explaining that the plaintiff must “meet 
the burdens of production and persuasion” in demonstrating “that an employer used a forbidden consideration,” 
regardless of whether it is a pretext or mixed-motive case). 
133.  See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 776–80 
(2006) (arguing that the existence of the disparate impact theory “led to judicial neglect of the disparate 
treatment theory, and also created the false impression that disparate treatment equaled animus”). Intentional 
discrimination means consciously making decisions on the basis of the protected characteristic, as described in 
the classic “because of, not merely in spite of” formulation. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The actor need not bear any hostility toward the adversely affected 
class; animus is merely evidence of intent. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive 
Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 501–02 (2001) 
(discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding animus). 
134.  See generally MARK SHERRY, DISABILITY HATE CRIMES: DOES ANYONE REALLY HATE DISABLED 
PEOPLE? (2010) (arguing that animus against persons with disabilities is greatly underestimated). Professor 
Sherry found disbelief in the existence of animus against persons with disabilities among audiences at his own 
speeches, id. at xiv, in mainstream newspapers, id. at 29, and even in at least one British government report, id. 
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myth that disability-based animus does not exist may have an even greater impact 
on plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities, as animus toward persons with 
psychiatric disabilities is especially prevalent.135 
But even the fact that intentional discrimination does not require animus is of 
little comfort. Although the Supreme Court unambiguously stated in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins that acting on a stereotype is a form of intentional 
discrimination,136 that holding is useful in proving intent only where the 
stereotype has been expressed in some way.137 Misjudgments and rash decisions 
alone do not sufficiently support an inference of discriminatory intent; the 
plaintiff must still somehow prove that the employer was acting on a 
stereotype.138 In fact, the problem of stereotyping without clear expression has led 
some legal realists to characterize the disparate impact theory, which does not 
require proof of intent, as an “evidentiary dragnet” used to ferret out hidden 
discriminatory intent.139 Perhaps more worrisome for plaintiffs with psychiatric 
disabilities, the assertion that an employer is acting on a stereotype may even be 
dismissed out of hand by a court that happens to accept the stereotype as truth.140 
In addition, employers’ stereotypes frequently play out unconsciously, where 
they might be inferred only from a long-term pattern of behavior.141 “These 
stereotypes are not conscious in the sense that the actors express a belief . . . and 
if one were asked, they would almost certainly deny any such belief. But their 
 
at 52–53. The same myth may exist in the legal system as well. See id. at 82–83 (suggesting that American 
prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute crimes against persons with disabilities as hate crimes because they do not 
consider animus to be a likely motive). 
135.  See id. at 41–42 (describing “an informal disability hierarchy underpinning antidisability websites” 
in which “people with cognitive impairments and psychiatric impairments are located at the bottom of 
humanity.”). 
136.  490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”). 
137.  See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on 
State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1164–66 (2007) (citing several 
commentators who assert that the disparate impact theory is necessary to uncover hidden intent). In Price 
Waterhouse, the stereotypes were expressly stated; no inference was necessary. 490 U.S. at 235. 
138.  See Selmi, supra note 133, at 706 (noting the difficulty of proving intent where “evidence of overt 
bias or animus is lacking”). 
139.  Seicshnaydre, supra note 137, at 1164–66. 
140.  Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment 
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2000) (describing 
several cases). Particularly where the direct threat exception is involved, some court opinions have been so 
conclusory about the plaintiff’s condition as to imply that the court accepts the stereotype as true. See, e.g., 
Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 513 (1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Paranoid schizophrenia 
often entails the sort of violent outbursts . . . that an employer need not accommodate.”); Hubbard, supra note 
17, at 921–22 (discussing Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty, 905 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1995) and criticizing the 
court’s evidence-free assumption about the plaintiff’s “inability to control her behavior.”). 
141.  See Selmi, supra note 133, at 778–79 (“Because subtle discrimination is not fueled by a conscious 
motive or any express animus, there has been a struggle . . . to determine whether existing proof structures can 
accommodate the changed nature of discrimination . . . .”). 
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actions indicate otherwise . . . .”142 Policies and procedures that allow subjective 
criteria, and thus unconscious stereotypes, to play an excessive role in 
employment decisions may constitute disparate impact discrimination.143 Whether 
unconscious stereotyping rise to the level of intentional discrimination remains a 
subject of heated debate in academic circles,144 but in practice courts have 
generally limited intentional discrimination to conscious intent.145 This limitation 
particularly disadvantages psychiatric disability discrimination plaintiffs because 
psychiatric disability discrimination so frequently takes the form of risk 
assessments colored by commonly accepted stereotypes.146  
The ADA analysis is further complicated in that its accommodation 
requirement, its exceptions, and the diversity of disabilities all blur the lines 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact.147 The direct threat exception, 
properly seen as an exception to the protected class due to its description as a 
permitted qualification standard, allows an employer to consider the employee’s 
disability; and the accommodation requirement requires an employer to act 
because of an employee’s disability.148 Both present ways for an employer to 
consciously act because of a disability without overt discriminatory intent, and 
even invite some degree of unconscious stereotyping.149 
 
142.  Id. at 779. 
143.  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (holding that promotion criteria 
depending on an “undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking” could constitute disparate impact 
discrimination). 
144.  TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 514–15 
(2d. ed. 2011). 
145.  White & Krieger, supra note 133, at 506. At least one federal court, while using this approach, has 
expressed reservations about it. Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 
2004) (“Such subjective decision-making processes are particularly susceptible to being influenced not by overt 
bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions about others that the decisionmaker may not even be 
aware of—hence the difficulty of ferreting out discrimination as a motivating factor.”). 
146.  Hubbard, supra note 17, at 921 (explaining how stereotypes of mental illness may affect the 
objectivity of a direct threat assessment). 
147.  See James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has 
Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2005) (observing that disparate 
impact claims under Title I of the ADA often involve individual discrimination that closely resembles disparate 
treatment or failure to accommodate); see also Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable 
Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 71 (2008) (noting 
significant uncertainty and debate in the relationship between accommodation and nondiscrimination in the 
ADA). 
148.  See Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying 
the Burden-Shifting Frameworks Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought 
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98 (1997) (arguing that 
the traditional framework of proof for intentional discrimination breaks down in ADA cases where the disability 
is part of the employer’s proffered justification); see also Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 987 (11th Cir. 
1992) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (“Because handicapped people are entitled by law to preferential treatment . . . 
necessary to afford them equal access to housing, a disparate impact analysis is useless in this context and in 
fact negates the entire intent of including handicapped people within the FHAA.”) 
149.  See Basas, supra note 147, at 102, 109–10 (arguing that the ADA, by allowing employers to engage 
in cost analysis, invites employers to “[indulge] in some slippery rounds of the worst case scenario game” and 
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The lines are particularly blurry for psychiatric disabilities that manifest 
through behavior; the types of discrimination to which psychiatric disabilities are 
most susceptible defy easy characterization within any of the three recognized 
causes of action, and may arguably be any of the three.150 When an employer 
removes a person with a psychiatric disability for “endangering conduct,” for 
example, then all three theories are in play. The employee’s diagnosis may be a 
conscious motivating factor, which would constitute intentional discrimination.151 
On the other hand, the removal could be the result of a policy that fails to make 
an adequate assessment of dangerousness and allows completely unconscious 
bias to play too much of a role in the process, which would constitute disparate 
impact discrimination.152 Finally, psychiatric disabilities that manifest themselves 
as behavior may require accommodation in the form of modification of 
workplace rules or policies,153 and employers must consider whether a reasonable 
accommodation can mitigate a direct threat.154 The affirmative duty to engage 
directly with the employee to determine an appropriate accommodation arguably 
does not disappear when the employer suspects a direct threat to workplace 
safety.155 An omission in any of these affirmative duties constitutes failure to 
 
allows “reasonable” to become a proxy for unconscious bias). 
150.  See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 155 (noting that psychiatric disabilities are particularly susceptible to 
discriminatory application of workplace conduct rules and related policies). 
151.  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (establishing the mixed motives standard). 
152.  Because the direct threat exception requires an objective, individualized, and medically sound 
assessment, a policy that fails to make such an assessment is clearly unlawful. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85, 287 (1987). However, such a policy does not necessarily reflect any 
discriminatory motive. Even where unconscious bias is involved in the decision-making process, whether it 
constitutes discriminatory intent is uncertain. GLYNN ET AL., supra note 144, at 514–15; see also Thomas v. 
Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (describing subjective decision-making 
processes as “particularly susceptible to being influenced” by unconscious bias without discriminatory intent). 
153.  See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997) (observing that some 
accommodation for disability-caused conduct is necessary because not doing so would render the ADA 
meaningless for disabilities that manifest themselves behaviorally). 
154.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2006) (defining “direct threat” as “a significant risk . . . that cannot be 
eliminated by reasonable accommodation”). The employer always carries the burden to prove inability to 
reasonably accommodate a disability. Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (Former 5th Cir. Nov. 
1981). Arguably, a failure to consider accommodations could be probative of the alleged direct threat being a 
pretext for intentional discrimination, but that argument does not appear to have been brought in litigation to 
date. See Kera Croteau, Comment, Lack of Unity in ADA Decisions Leaves Bipolar Sufferers Unprotected and 
Employers Confused, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 1059, 1084 (2006) (stating the inverse, that efforts to accommodate a 
disability are probative of the credibility of a proffered legitimate reason). 
155.  Tory L. Lucas, So What If I’m Gonna Hurt Myself: The ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, NEB. LAW., 
Sept. 2003, at 7, 15. No court has considered the question on whether the interactive process is still mandatory 
when an employee may pose a direct threat to health or safety. See Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 336 F.3d 
1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). However, on a number of occasions, courts have accepted without argument that the 
interactive process is mandatory regardless of circumstances. E.g., Reinhardt v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
R.R., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1114 & n.4 (D. Mont. 2012); EEOC v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 
1073, 1083 (D. Minn. 2010); French v. Providence Everett Medical Center, No. C07-0217RSL, 2008 WL 
4186538, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2008). 
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accommodate.156 Plaintiffs often plead all three of the claims available under the 
ADA.157 
Inevitably, the blurring between the various ADA causes of action leaves 
situations in which plaintiffs may reasonably plead discriminatory intent but 
expect to prevail only on other theories.158 These situations arise 
disproportionately often in psychiatric disability discrimination cases.159 Often, an 
employer does not act with intent to discriminate, but instead fails to act on an 
affirmative duty (arising from the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate 
and direct threat exception) to avoid unnecessary discrimination.160 Between 
society’s reluctance to find disability-based animus and the particular likelihood 
that psychiatric disability discrimination falls into the gray areas between 
disparate treatment and disparate impact causes of action, plaintiffs with 
psychiatric disabilities may receive only equitable relief. This is likely even when 
defendants’ conduct is more culpable than that typically associated with disparate 
impact discrimination. 
C. Equitable Relief and its Limitations 
Equitable relief is generally limited to reinstatement, injunctive relief as 
needed, and back pay.161 
Courts have some discretion to award “front pay” for a reasonable period of 
time, if the plaintiff has been discharged and reinstatement is not feasible due to 
“continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or 
because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the 
discrimination.”162 However, front pay is rarely awarded;163 a court must 
 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). 
157.  See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (holding that disparate treatment and 
disparate impact discrimination are separate claims that must be pled separately in a complaint). 
158.  See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 153–55 (noting that psychiatric disabilites are particularly susceptible 
to being penalized as “misconduct,” leaving open the question of whether the employer acted because of the 
disability or pursuant to a facially-neutral policy). 
159.  See id. at 155 (noting that psychiatric disabilities are particularly susceptible to discriminatory 
application of workplace conduct rules and related policies); Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 108 (finding that 
prevailing ADA plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are less likely to receive monetary awards than plaintiffs 
with other disabilities). 
160.  BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 68; see also David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 943–44 (1993) (arguing that the affirmative 
duty to reasonably accommodate disabilities essentially prohibits negligent discrimination). 
161.  See generally supra Part II.C (discussing ADA remedies). 
162.  Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). Front pay, which is money 
awarded to replace lost post-judgment compensation, is considered an equitable remedy rather than 
compensatory damages. Id. at 846, 852. 
163.  See EEOC v. Century Broad. Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that if “hostility 
common to litigation” justified a front pay award, “reinstatement would cease to be a remedy except in cases 
where the defendant felt like reinstating the plaintiff.”). 
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“carefully articulate its reasons for awarding front pay,” and there must be 
unusual circumstances such as hostility in excess of that normally attendant to 
litigation.164 
For psychiatric disabilities, the typical remedy of back pay and reinstatement 
creates new problems for the prevailing plaintiff: the plaintiff’s disability 
becomes known to many more people in the workplace than would have 
otherwise been aware of it, creating stigma or hostility in addition to that 
normally resulting from litigation.165 Many courts have been reluctant to allow 
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities to sue under fictitious names.166 And even 
in the best-case scenario, when a plaintiff is actually able to seal his or her real 
name and litigate under a fictitious name, the plaintiff’s coworkers may still 
become aware of the lawsuit and the parties’ factual allegations. Although efforts 
have been made to destigmatize psychiatric disabilities, and not all coworkers 
who learn about an individual’s psychiatric disability react badly, the enduring 
stigma makes disclosure risky.167 For some individuals, disclosure of a psychiatric 
disability is itself traumatic and may lead to exacerbation of the disability.168 The 
decision to disclose a psychiatric disability is not made lightly.169 
For people whose disabilities are not immediately apparent, most of the 
situations in which an ADA claim may arise do not involve widespread 
disclosure of a disability prior to litigation.170 Adverse employment actions may 
be taken by just one person. Although an individual must obviously disclose a 
disability to request accommodations, the process of requesting and obtaining 
 
164.  Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999). In Farley, the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld an award of front pay, finding reinstatement not feasible because the plaintiff’s supervisors and 
coworkers had subjected him to persistent verbal abuse and anonymous hate mail related to his mental illness 
for four years prior to his termination. Id. The court contrasted Farley’s case from Walther v. Lone Star Gas 
Co., in which the Fifth Circuit vacated a front pay award that had been based solely on “protracted and 
necessarily vexing” litigation. Id. at 1339–40 (citing Walther, 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992)). The hostility 
justifying a front pay award need not be as extreme in severity or duration as in Farley; in one age 
discrimination case, a record showing an officer of the defendant corporation referring to one plaintiff as a 
“cancer” and making “numerous attacks during the trial on plaintiffs’ abilities” supported the finding that 
“plaintiffs and [defendant] could no longer co-exist in a business relationship . . . .” Cancellier v. Federated 
Dep’t Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
165.  See supra Part III.A (discussing the stigma surrounding psychiatric disabilities and the frequent 
invisibility of psychiatric disabilities in the workplace). 
166.  Sarah Orme, Note, Justice or Mental Health . . . Should Litigants Have to Choose? Mental Health as 
a Reason to Proceed Anonymously, 44 IND. L. REV. 605, 616–17 (2011). 
167.  See generally Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 229–33. One study found that, whereas job 
candidates with visible “physical” disabilities faced relatively little stigma compared to other historically 
disadvantaged groups, employers viewed those with psychiatric disabilities even more negatively than 
candidates who had spent time in prison. Id. at 228–29 (citing Colbert et al., supra note 20). 
168.  Orme, supra note 166, at 613. 
169.  See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that many individuals with psychiatric disabilites decline to 
disclose their disabilities even though it means forfeiting legal rights). 
170.  See generally Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 229–33 (noting that people with psychiatric 
disabilities generally attempt to minimize disclosure in the workplace). 
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accommodations does not compel disclosure to more than a few people.171 Even 
after disability discrimination has occurred, the EEOC charge process generally 
does not lead to widespread disclosure; an EEOC investigation of an employer 
typically involves contact with only a few people,172 and information that the 
EEOC obtains in the course of its investigation is confidential.173 Thus, at the time 
a person with a psychiatric disability might consider litigation, the majority of the 
person’s coworkers might well be completely unaware of the disability. 
Conversely, it may become public knowledge after litigation, opening the 
plaintiff to stigma from many more directions than before.174 
Even when the disclosure of a psychiatric disability does not cause overt 
hostility in the workplace, it subtly alters the way others view a person’s 
behavior, as what would otherwise be considered normal emotional responses 
may be read as manifestations of mental illness.175 Paradoxically, people with 
known psychiatric disabilities must often maintain even greater composure than 
their colleagues in order to avoid scrutiny of their mental status, and in turn, their 
competence or the risk they may pose to workplace safety.176 
Ultimately, litigation means disclosure of a psychiatric disability, at least 
within the workplace.177 As a result, most employment discrimination plaintiffs 
with psychiatric disabilities face the prospect of returning to workplaces in which 
their psychiatric disabilities have become widely known.178 
D. Psychiatric Disabilities as Barriers to Relief 
Because private litigation is such a critical component of ADA enforcement, 
people with psychiatric disabilities must choose between enforcing their statutory 
 
171.  See PARRY, supra note 38, at 220–23 (describing various accommodations found reasonable for 
psychiatric disabilities). 
172.  See the Charge Handling Process, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, http://www.eeoc. 
gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing ways in 
which investigators obtain information); John Costello, EEOC Investigation: What Happens After the Request 
for Information?, HR INFO CTR. (May 20, 2009), http://rapidlearninginstitute.com/ hric/eeoc-investigation-
what-happens-after-the-request-for-information/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that on-site 
investigations, the most intrusive of investigatory methods, are “not used that frequently”). 
173.  42 U.S.C. 42 § 2000e-5(b) (2006). 
174.  See supra Part III.A (discussing the stigma associated with psychiatric disabilities); see also Sara 
Noel, Comment, Parity in Mental Health Coverage: The Goal of Equal Access to Mental Health Treatment 
Under the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 and the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, 26 
HAMLINE L. REV. 377, 405–06 (2003) (arguing that private enforcement of insurance parity laws is flawed 
because privacy concerns deter litigation). 
175.  Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 232. 
176.  Id. 
177.  See supra notes 165–168 and accompanying text (discussing how litigation exposes a previously 
invisible disability). 
178.  Id. 
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rights and keeping their privacy.179 Although it is true that the exposure of 
unsavory facts is part of the cost of litigation, disclosure of a psychiatric 
disability has a particularly chilling effect on plaintiffs because it directly 
undermines what is often the only available remedy. Essentially, the act of 
seeking a remedy renders injunctive relief meaningless by creating widespread 
exposure of a psychiatric disability and potentially creating hostility in the 
workplace.180 Whereas an injunction for reinstatement or accommodations 
improves the position of a plaintiff with visible disabilities, the same remedy, for 
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities, may leave the plaintiff facing worse 
discrimination than before, even in the complete absence of any retaliatory 
motive on the employer’s part.181 
Psychiatric disabilities also create their own obstacles for potential plaintiffs. 
Litigation is inherently extremely stressful, and plaintiffs with psychiatric 
disabilities are especially likely to lack the ability to independently litigate a 
claim.182 The likely exposure of a psychiatric condition that accompanies 
litigation can be particularly traumatic in itself.183 Even when the plaintiffs have 
the ability and willingness to litigate, “[m]any lawyers share the prejudices of the 
population at large,”184 restricting access to the legal system by stereotyping 
potential clients with psychiatric disabilities as lacking capacity or being 
otherwise “difficult.”185 
 
179.  See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that many individuals with psychiatric disabilities decline 
to disclose their disabilities even though it means forfeiting legal rights); see also Noel, supra note 174, at 405–
06 (suggesting that the possibility of being forced to litigate an insurance parity claim and expose one’s medical 
history may deter individuals with mental illness from seeking necessary treatment); cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Anti-Defamation League Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 25, 2010), 2010 WL 4622566 (arguing that separating “domestic partnerships” from marriage 
unconstitutionally conditions receipt of ostensibly equal benefits on disclosure of sexual orientation and 
resulting exposure to stigma; much like a psychiatric disability, sexual orientation is not readily apparent and its 
nondisclosure is a constitutionally protected privacy interest). 
180.  A hostile work environment will not always arise following reinstatement, of course, but the 
prevalence of negative stereotypes of psychiatric disabilities makes it reasonable for a potential litigant to 
anticipate some stigmatization. Stigma arising from disclosure of a hidden disability may be entirely separate 
from hostility arising from litigation. Even those who fully understand the justification for a lawsuit and bear no 
ill-will as a result of the litigation itself may begin to act unconsciously on perceptions of the prevailing 
plaintiff’s diagnosis. Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 232. 
181.  See supra Part III.C (discussing reasons reinstatement may not be feasible in psychiatric disability 
discrimination cases). 
182. See Noel, supra note 174, at 406 (noting that private enforcement of health insurance parity is 
difficult because people with mental illness are often unable to endure the stress inherent to litigation). The 
argument applies with even greater force to discrimination claims than to health insurance parity claims, 
because long-lasting exacerbation of the underlying disability may impair the plaintiff’s ability to litigate until 
after the relevant statute of limitations has run. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 15–16 (quoting people for whom 
discrimination exacerbated a psychiatric disability for “years”).  
183.  Orme, supra note 166, at 613. 
184.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 26–27. 
185.  Twitchy Woman, Ableist Attorneys, WEIRDLAW (Feb. 8, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://whoselaw. 
wordpress.com/2012/02/08/ableist-attorneys/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing and 
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Even in plaintiffs without psychiatric disabilities, “[e]motional distress is a 
predictable, and thus foreseeable, consequence” and even “a probable result” of 
discrimination itself.186 But discrimination causes particularly severe emotional 
distress in persons with psychiatric disabilities.187 “The impact of discrimination 
and stigma on a person’s job performance . . . may be more deleterious than the 
effects of the illness itself.”188 For many people with serious psychiatric illnesses, 
work is a highly effective coping mechanism, and loss of employment deprives a 
person of that mechanism.189 Perceived discrimination or rejection has a “startling 
and disturbing” detrimental influence on depressive symptoms190 and  may lead to 
social withdrawal.191 This observation also has a theoretical basis in psychology: 
discrimination exacerbates psychiatric disabilities by confirming negative self-
image,192 acting directly counter to the principles of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy.193 One study also suggests that, in addition to directly impacting a 
psychiatric disability’s symptoms, perceived stigma negatively affects adherence 
to medication regimens, indirectly increasing the disability’s severity.194 
The lack of an effective remedy in many psychiatric disability discrimination 
cases may further contribute to emotional distress.195 One survey of disability 
discrimination plaintiffs found that, for many litigants with psychiatric 
 
criticizing the frequency with which legal aid organizations refuse to represent clients due to the client’s mental 
illness). 
186.  Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
187.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 15–16 (quoting survey responses). In making this observation, one must 
be careful not to equate it with an all-encompassing mental weakness. Discrimination affects specific 
vulnerabilities in ways that normal stressors do not. See infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text. 
188.  John S. Strauss & Larry Davidson, Mental Disorders, Work, and Choice, in MENTAL DISORDER, 
WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 105, 126. 
189.  Saks, supra note 3 (“One of the most frequent mentioned techniques that help our research 
participants manage their symptoms was work.”). 
190.  Bruce G. Link et al., The Consequences of Stigma for the Self-Esteem of People with Mental Illness, 
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1621, 1625 (2001). 
191.  Id. at 1621–22. 
192.  Id. at 1622. 
193.  See Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (July 2012), 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=About_Treatments_and_Supports&template=/ContentManagemen
t/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=7952 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing general principles 
of cognitive-behavioral therapy). Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), in which the patient aims to actively 
challenge negative thoughts, is highly effective in the treatment of a wide range of psychiatric illnesses. Andrew 
C. Butler et al., The Empirical Status of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: A Review of Meta-Analyses, 26 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 17 (2006). 
194.  Jo Anne Sirey et al., Perceived Stigma and Patient-Rated Severity of Illness as Predictors of 
Antidepressant Drug Adherence, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1615 (2001). 
195.  See Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 119 (discussing causes of dissatisfaction in litigants with 
psychiatric disabilities); Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Appellate Decision-Making in the Context of Disabled 
Litigants, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 313, 314 (2000) (“If they depart from their cases feeling demoralized by or 
disenfranchised from the process, this can be profoundly counter-therapeutic.”). 
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disabilities, “the perception of procedural unfairness adds insult to injury.”196 A 
potential plaintiff, forewarned of the available remedies after seeking legal 
advice, could reasonably perceive a certain unfairness in the legal framework.197 
This sense of unfairness might easily add to a perception of stigma, exacerbating 
psychiatric symptoms just as the original act of discrimination did before, and 
further impairing the potential plaintiff’s ability to litigate an employment 
discrimination claim.198 
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS 
One answer to the privacy concerns inherent in litigation is to use alternative 
dispute resolution, which has the advantages of confidentiality and reduced stress 
for employees, and may provide negligent employers with a “less guilt-oriented 
medium to resolve disputes.”199 Because the EEOC has routinely referred charges 
to a voluntary mediation program for over a decade,200 employers are generally 
aware of the option of mediation, and parties that were not previously aware of 
the option typically know of it by the time they are seriously considering 
litigation. Why, then, is alternative dispute resolution not the preferred means of 
settling psychiatric disability discrimination claims? This Part examines the 
EEOC’s highly effective yet underused voluntary mediation program, and 
explores the ways in which employers and the EEOC respectively contribute to 
the underuse of the mediation program for psychiatric disability discrimination 
charges. 
A. The EEOC and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
As its caseload has increased over the last two decades, the EEOC has made 
increasing use of mediation to resolve disputes, with pilot programs beginning as 
early as 1991 and a formal, nationwide voluntary mediation program existing 
since 1999.201 
 
196.  Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 119. 
197.  See supra notes 158–60, 179–81, and accompanying text (noting that the direct threat exception 
actually allows an employer to act because of a disability, and that litigation generally means disclosure of a 
disability). A plaintiff with a psychiatric disability may view both of these aspects of litigation as disfavoring 
litigants with psychiatric disabilities in comparison with other disabilities.  
198.  See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure inherent in litigation and 
the stigma that accompanies disclosure). 
199.  Butcher, supra note 86, at 226. 
200.  See Kathryn Moss et al., Mediation of Employment Discrimination Disputes Involving Persons with 
Psychiatric Disabilities, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 988, 988–89 (2002) (discussing the history of the EEOC’s 
mediation program). 
201.  Id. 
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The EEOC uses a priority system to streamline its handling of charges.202 
Upon receipt of a charge, the EEOC assigns the charge to a priority category on 
the basis of an initial review.203 The EEOC places in “category A” and fully 
investigates charges for which the initial review suggests a high probability that 
discrimination occurred.204 “Category B” charges are those for which the EEOC 
needs additional evidence to evaluate the merits; the EEOC routinely asks the 
employer for its side of the story but conducts further investigation “only as 
resources permit.”205 Finally, the system places in “category C” charges that 
appear to lack merit, and typically, the EEOC quickly dismisses them.206 
The EEOC’s mediation process focuses on “category B” charges, which may 
appear to have some merit on initial review but are extremely unlikely to be 
selected for litigation.207 The EEOC refers more than seventy percent of “category 
B” charges to its voluntary mediation program, along with a significant minority 
of “category A” charges and even some “category C” charges.208 When the EEOC 
refers a charge for mediation, it asks both complainants and employers whether 
they are willing to participate in mediation.209 Mediation occurs only if both 
parties agree to participate.210 
B. The Employer Perspective on Mediation 
The EEOC mediation program has been highly successful in reaching 
amicable settlements and both employers and employees have reported being 
highly satisfied.211 However, it has been of little value to complainants with 
psychiatric disabilities because, despite the willingness of most complainants, 
few employers agree to participate in mediation.212 Empirically, while the vast 
majority of disability discrimination complainants referred to the EEOC 
mediation program agree to participate in mediation, only a minority of 
employers do so.213 Employers have been even less willing to enter mediation 
with psychiatric disability cases than with other types of disabilities.214 Jeffrey 
 
202.  Michael D. Ullman et al., The EEOC Charge Priority Policy and Claimants with Psychiatric 
Disabilities, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 644, 644 (2001). 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Moss et al., supra note 200, at 990. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211. Id. at 989. 
212.  Id. at 990–91. 
213.  Id. at 990. Complainants with psychiatric disabilities are approximately as likely to agree to 
participate as complainants with other disabilities. Id. 
214.  Id. 
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Swanson and co-authors have advanced two potential explanations for 
employers’ refusal to enter settlement negotiations: employers “might have 
stronger negative attitudes . . . and simply be more averse to employing” people 
with psychiatric disabilities, or they “might calculate that they are more likely to 
win in court against . . . a stigmatized mentally ill employee than a physically 
disabled employee . . . .”215 
Surveys conducted by the EEOC indicate that employers most frequently 
decline to participate in mediation because they believe the charges lack merit.216 
These surveys did not address psychiatric disability or even disability 
discrimination, or disparities in employer participation in mediation across 
different types of employment discrimination charges, but were aimed at 
determining what could be done to increase the use of mediation generally.217 
Nevertheless, the surveys suggest that an employer’s primary consideration in 
deciding whether to agree to mediation is, quite rationally, how much it stands to 
lose in litigation. 
Employers might not necessarily perceive the merits of psychiatric disability 
discrimination charges differently from other disability discrimination charges. 
The EEOC has already categorized charges by apparent merit on initial review,218 
and of the cases that go to mediation, the likelihood of reaching a settlement is 
similar for psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities.219 Instead, the disparity in 
employer willingness to participate may reflect, not only the perceived likelihood 
of winning or losing once litigation commences, but the perceived likelihood of 
litigation occurring at all. Often an employer that refuses to mediate will 
subsequently agree to mediation after the aggrieved employee has retained an 
attorney.220 Indeed, it would seem that employers tend to objectively evaluate the 
merits of aggrieved employees’ claims only after receiving some indication that 
the employee is seriously considering a private lawsuit.221 The unspoken subtext 
in the EEOC’s findings is that employers first consider the likelihood that the 
employee will litigate a claim in the first place.222 Regardless of the merits of the 
 
215.  Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 129. 
216.  E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Investigation of the Reasons for the Lack of Employer Participation 
in the EEOC Mediation Program, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www. 
eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/report/study3/index.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
217.  Id. 
218.  See Ullman et al., supra note 202, at 644 (describing the charge priority system); Moss et al., supra 
note 200, at 990 (noting the EEOC mediation program’s focus on medium-priority charges). 
219.  Moss et al., supra note 200, at 990. 
220.  Transcript of Meeting of December 2, 2003: EEOC Mediation Program and the Workplace Benefits 
of Mediation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Dec. 2, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/ 
archive/12-2-03/transcript.html (Panel One, remarks of Dr. Patrick McDermott) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
221.  Id. The majority of employers refusing mediation have not yet consulted an attorney at the time, and 
many appear to consult an attorney only when the threat of a lawsuit is more imminent. Id. 
222.  Such a conclusion does not imply any dishonesty on the part of employers responding to the EEOC 
survey. The perceived strength of a claim tends to reflect the perceived likelihood that the employee will 
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employee’s claim, there is no financial benefit to mediating if the employee 
shows no intent to sue.223 Where the employee has a hidden disability and 
exposure may deter litigation, the employer would have reason to conclude that 
litigation is less likely. Such a conclusion could in turn lead employers to 
rationally refuse to participate in mediation, perhaps explaining why mediation 
has so often been unavailable to EEOC complainants with psychiatric 
disabilities. 
C. Possible Bias at the EEOC? 
Regardless of the charge priority level, the decision to refer charges to 
mediation is largely at the discretion of EEOC field offices.224 Some evidence 
supports the possibility that the EEOC is less likely to refer charges involving 
psychiatric disabilities for mediation than charges involving other disabilities.225 
Some EEOC staff reported that they declined to refer complainants with 
psychiatric disabilities for mediation because “they become too emotional,” 
suggesting an assumption that people with psychiatric disabilities lacked the 
ability to negotiate rationally.226 
But as damning as the anecdotal evidence may seem, the difference between 
psychiatric disabilities and other disabilities is quite small, if statistically 
significant; psychiatric disabilities are only four percent less likely to be referred 
to mediation.227 It is possible that certain diagnoses are subject to greater degrees 
of bias than others; individuals with schizophrenia, specifically, are less likely to 
be referred to mediation than those with other psychiatric disabilities.228 
 
ultimately decide to litigate. Making decisions based on the likelihood of litigation rather than the likelihood of 
liability is a rational approach, as the filing of a lawsuit immediately results in some expense and inconvenience 
regardless of its merits. 
223.  Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 88, at 1023. 
224. See Moss et al., supra note 200, at 989 (examining the actual process of referral for mediation at 
EEOC field offices); Questions and Answers About Mediation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/qanda.cfm (last visited June 4, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (describing numerous factors that the EEOC uses to determine whether a charge is appropriate for 
mediation). 
225.  Moss et al., supra note 200, at 989, 992. 
226.  Id. at 989. That stereotype has proven to be untrue: complainants with psychiatric disabilities are no 
less likely to successfully negotiate a settlement than those with other disabilities. Id. at 992. 
227.  Id. at 992. A statistically significant disparity is one that exceeds the study’s margin of error; it 
strongly supports the inference that the disparity actually exists in the population as a whole and is not a product 
of normal variation between random samples. Here, the reasonable inference is that there is an actual disparity 
in EEOC treatment of psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities, but only a slight one. 
228.  Id. 
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V. PROTECTING EMPLOYEES’ STATUTORY RIGHTS USING TORT LAW AND 
OTHER MECHANISMS 
As a result of limited remedies and strong disincentives against litigation, 
existing enforcement mechanisms are failing to protect the statutorily guaranteed 
rights of employees with psychiatric disabilities. This Part argues that a 
compensatory damages remedy would provide the appropriate incentives for 
meaningful enforcement of ADA Title I,229 and suggests several common-law 
approaches that a plaintiff might use to obtain a damages remedy230 as well as a 
modification to EEOC policy to increase access to the EEOC’s voluntary 
mediation program.231 
A. The Need for Compensatory Damages 
The single most significant obstacle to alternative dispute resolution and 
other forms of negotiated settlements is employer unwillingness to enter 
negotiations, and the most common reason for an employer’s refusal to negotiate 
is knowledge that the employee is unlikely to litigate.232 A more consistently 
available compensatory damages remedy would create the credible threat of 
litigation necessary to bring employers to the negotiating table;233 although a 
compensatory damages remedy would not always overcome the significant 
disadvantages of litigation, it would make litigation a meaningful option. The 
greater likelihood of damages liability, moreover, would incentivize settlement. 
A meaningful remedy could even make litigation empowering rather than 
debilitating for some plaintiffs; instead of merely prohibiting discrimination 
against people with psychiatric disabilities in principle, the law would provide a 
way to hold employers accountable in practice.234 The availability of 
compensatory damages would communicate to potential plaintiffs that the legal 
system takes their grievances seriously,235 and a judgment awarding 
 
229.  See infra Part V.A. 
230.  See infra Part V.C. 
231.  See infra Part V.E. 
232.  See supra Part IV.B (discussing the barriers to litigation that people with psychiatric disability face). 
233.  See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for employer refusal to 
participate in alternative dispute resolution). 
234.  See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 74 
(2010) (observing that litigation may give plaintiffs the “empowering or cathartic” opportunity to tell their 
stories). Litigation’s ability to empower a plaintiff depends in large part on its availability as a meaningful 
option that can adequately redress the wrong suffered. See Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 64 (2011) (“The purpose of the adversary system is to provide a forum for a fair fight 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, and it is in the very process of this struggle that the plaintiff’s honor is 
vindicated.”). 
235.  See Freckelton, supra note 195, at 321 (observing, in the context of New Zealand’s involuntary 
commitment hearing process, that “[i]f the patient emerges from the hearing disappointed, but feels that he has 
been treated fairly and with dignity, given an opportunity to air grievances, and listened to . . . it can make a 
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compensatory damages would serve as an unambiguous “message from the 
courts that certain conduct is unacceptable.”236 These messages might reduce the 
perception of unfairness that currently plagues plaintiffs in psychiatric disability 
discrimination suits.237 
In addition to creating an incentive to negotiate in good faith, compensatory 
damages liability can serve as a deterrent against “negligent” discrimination.238 
As noted previously, many of the disability discrimination cases that fall into the 
“disparate impact” category involve forms of conduct by the defendant that can 
be deterred by damages liability, whether that conduct is intentional conduct not 
driven by a discriminatory motive or strict application of a qualification standard 
without regard for a person’s disability.239 These forms of discrimination are 
arguably “negligent” in that they involve failure to act on an affirmative duty.240 
The direct threat exception imposes an affirmative duty to make individualized 
assessments, and the requirement of reasonable accommodation parallels, to 
some degree, the duty of reasonable care in tort law.241 The precise nature of these 
affirmative duties has been made clear by statute and case law.242 The likely 
rationale for barring compensatory damages, that disparate impact discrimination 
cannot be deterred by damages liability due to lack of moral culpability,243 does 
 
significant difference to the patient’s mental state.”). 
236.  Id. at 313. 
237.  See Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 118–19 (noting that ADA plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities 
were particularly dissatisfied with a “perception of procedural unfairness”). “People with psychiatric disabilities 
were significantly less likely than people with other disabilities to feel that they had a chance to tell their stories, 
that they were treated with dignity, or that decisionmakers were fair.” Id. 
238.  See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text (noting that employers may be liable solely for 
disparate impact discrimination even though their culpability exceeds that typically associated with the 
disparate impact cause of action). Law and economics generally characterizes damages liability for negligence 
as an incentive to increase safety precautions to the point where an actor’s conduct is no longer negligent. See 
generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
239.  See supra Part III.B (discussing the blurring of causes of action in disability discrimination cases). 
240.  See Oppenheimer, supra note 160 (drawing parallels between standards of culpability in 
antidiscrimination law and tort law, and arguing that “negligent” discrimination should be a separate cause of 
action). Professor Oppenheimer observes that the disparate treatment and disparate impact causes of action 
respectively resemble intentional and strict liability torts. Id. at 918–20. He also presents the ADA ‘s reasonable 
accommodation mandate as an example of a prohibition on what he terms “negligent” discrimination. Id. at 
943–44. Surprisingly, in the twenty years since Professor Oppenheimer’s article, courts have almost entirely 
eschewed reference to negligence as a theory of liability in ADA and other antidiscrimination cases. Sandra F. 
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 99–100 (2011) (discussing the courts’ 
surprising failure to consider the idea of negligent discrimination). Nevertheless, one appellate court has 
expressly drawn a parallel between “reasonable accommodation” in the ADA and “reasonable care” in tort law. 
Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
241.  BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 68. 
242.  See Kleiber v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing numerous 
cases holding that the interactive process for determining reasonable accommodations is mandatory); supra Part 
II.B. (describing the requirements for a sufficient assessment of a putative direct threat). 
243.  The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which established the present remedial 
scheme for employment discrimination, never expressly stated a rationale for excluding compensatory damages 
for disparate impact discrimination. However, providing “a necessary deterrent” was one of the primary 
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not apply where a clearly defined affirmative duty exists.244 Instead, damages 
liability may encourage employers to proactively review and change their 
policies regarding mental health in a way that the present remedial scheme does 
not.245 
Finally, compensatory damages are consistent with the general principle of 
corrective justice.246 The fact that disability discrimination often takes the form of 
an omission, rather than an animus-based act, should not preclude compensatory 
damages.247 Tort law calls for compensation for negligent acts or omissions; 
likewise, in the disability discrimination context, failure to act on a statutory 
obligation should give rise to liability for injury suffered as a result.248 
The primary objection to increasing the available remedies is that it would 
encourage excessive litigation.249 The ADA, in particular, is already “often 
accused of being a font of abusive and frivolous litigation”250 and “portrayed . . . 
 
motivations for applying compensatory and punitive damages to intentional discrimination. H.R. REP. NO. 102-
40, pt. 1, at 69 (1991). Courts and commentators have, to some extent, assumed that this rationale holds true and 
applied it to other titles of the ADA. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(suggesting that compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA, which concerns government programs, 
would be unfair without notice of alleged discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1244 (1995) (arguing that subjecting unconscious discrimination to a damages remedy would be 
counterproductive because such discrimination is unintentional); Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate 
Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 132 n.268 
(2006) (conceding that the author’s proposal of merging the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories 
“would disadvantage employers by providing additional relief to employees even where the employer has not 
enacted an intentionally discriminatory policy”). But see Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 948 (1993) (arguing that “there is no principled basis” to 
distinguish between the models of discrimination in determining remedies). 
244.  See Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a Prerequisite to 
Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1156 (2000) (“When there is no threat of liability, 
individuals could be induced to use too little care.”). 
245.  See Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 12 (noting that “the absence of a damages 
remedy “in Title III, the ADA’s public accommodations title, “gives businesses little reason not to take [a] ‘wait 
and see’ approach” of making facilities accessible “only in response to litigation”). Although fee-shifting 
arguably incentivizes compliance with nondiscrimination laws, it depends on plaintiffs’ willingness to litigate; 
the strong disincentives against litigation that people with psychiatric disabilities face may require something 
more to overcome. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1854 (2005) (arguing that lack of monetary incentive to litigate claims has resulted 
in widespread noncompliance with Title II and Title III of the ADA, which address government programs and 
public accommodations respectively); supra Part III.D. 
246.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010) 
(discussing rationales for imposing liability for negligence). 
247.  See Oppenheimer, supra note 160, at 970–73 (1993) (arguing that negligent discrimination should be 
actionable in order to focus on the fact of discrimination rather than the defendant’s moral reprehensibility). 
248.  See id. (arguing that negligent discrimination should be actionable in order to focus on the fact of 
discrimination rather than the defendant’s moral reprehensibility). 
249.  See Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 2 (“[B]usiness groups and their political allies 
have often criticized broad civil rights remedies–particularly the availability of monetary damages–as 
encouraging abusive and extortionate litigation practices.”) 
250.  BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 123. 
_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014  9:42 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol.44 
1021 
as a windfall statute for plaintiffs,”251 and critics are likely to see any increased 
remedy as inviting nuisance suits.252 These perceptions may be concerning 
because psychiatric disabilities are among the types of disabilities that critics 
paint as “convenient excuses for special treatment.”253 
Criticism of Title I based on “abusive and frivolous litigation” is, to a large 
extent, misplaced: much of the “abusive” ADA litigation arises from Title III, the 
public accommodations title, rather than Title I.254 Interestingly, even those 
critical of the volume of ADA litigation concede that the suits they decry as 
abusive generally have merit.255 
Existing checks on litigation already prevent the addition of a compensatory 
damages remedy from creating a flood of frivolous litigation. Lawyers already 
have a financial incentive to serve as “agents of quality control for the court 
system” and screen out most frivolous claims;256 this will not change if 
compensatory damages are available. Even if the psychiatric disability 
complaints filed with the EEOC tended to be weaker than those for other 
disabilities, it would not imply that the same is true of lawsuits reaching the court 
system.257 In addition, empirical evidence suggests that few potential plaintiffs 
actually insist on litigation; EEOC statistics demonstrate that the overwhelming 
majority of disability discrimination complainants, including those with 
psychiatric disabilities, are willing to accept mediation as an alternative to 
litigation.258 
Even if the number of ADA Title I lawsuits would increase, the fear of 
clogging the courts with frivolous suits does not justify denying an entire class of 
plaintiffs the effective protection of a duly passed statute.259 Effective 
 
251.  Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 99, 99 (1999). 
252.  Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 2–3. 
253.  Pamela M. Prah, Federal Enforcement of ADA Falls Short, Civil Rights Commission Says in Report, 
67 U.S.L.W. 2199 (Oct. 13, 1998). 
254. See Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 3–5 (discussing the controversy over “serial 
ADA public accommodations litigation”). Members of Congress have focused largely on Title III in repeated 
attempts to limit ADA litigation. Id. at 5. 
255.  Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 22. 
256.  Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 125. 
257.  Id. 
258.  Moss et al., supra note 200, at 990. 
259.  Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1640 (2004) (“The ultimate danger from court action that denies meaningful relief 
is that rights will be effectively nullified.”). The United States Supreme Court has suggested in a variety of 
contexts that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a meaningful remedy for 
prevailing plaintiffs, id. at 1640–41, and it is a fundamental principle of the common law that rights must have 
remedies. Id. at 1636–37 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) and Ashby v. White, 
92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703)). 
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enforcement of the ADA for plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities requires a 
remedy that makes litigation a meaningful option.260 
It may also seem paradoxical to create incentives to litigate a claim given the 
privacy and health implications of litigation for people with psychiatric 
disabilities.261 But there is a vast difference between litigation being an option 
with significant disadvantages and litigation being essentially a non-option 
because the remedy is illusory. The former allows aggrieved employees to 
reserve the option of litigation; the latter does not, which may lead employers to 
refuse to negotiate a settlement.262 Not every potential plaintiff needs to litigate; 
as long as some choose to do so, the threat of litigation is credible. 
B. Can Statutory Solutions Work? 
Amending the ADA to specifically address psychiatric disabilities is 
unsatisfactory because it could entrench the difference between psychiatric and 
other disabilities.263 Already, much of this difference lies in the way society views 
the disabilities.264 The social distinction between “physical” and “mental” 
disabilities “serves no legitimate rationale and perpetuates the stigmatization of 
mental illness.”265 In addition, disability rights advocates are extremely wary of 
their movement’s potential for fragmentation.266 For these reasons, disability 
rights activists, concerned about differential treatment in the legal system, have 
called for eliminating the separation of “physical” and “mental” disabilities in the 
statute.267 Enacting statutory language that provides for additional remedies for 
psychiatric disabilities comes dangerously close to establishing psychiatric 
disability as a privileged class within the disability rights structure and risks 
 
260.  See supra Part III.C–D (discussing barriers to litigation that potential plaintiffs with psychiatric 
disabilities face); Joan Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the Ramifications of This Retreat for the Vindication 
of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 283–84 (1984) (arguing that due process requires not only a 
substantive remedy but meaningful access to that remedy). 
261.  See supra Part III.D (discussing the privacy and mental health concerns that litigation implicates). 
262.  See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text (noting reasons for employer refusal to participate in 
alternative dispute resolution). 
263.  See Korn, supra note 17, at 647 (arguing that the mere reference to “mental and physical” disabilities 
in the ADA contributes to an “artificial dividing line” between the two). 
264.  Id. at 649. 
265.  Id. at 647. 
266.  See, e.g., Clarice Hausch, From the Executive Director, ADVOCARE 2, 3 (2007), available at 
http://wvadvocates.org/assets/docs/pubs/advocare/wvaadvocare30thanniversary.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (“Success will be difficult to achieve if we allow ourselves to be divided into disability silos 
competing against each other for funding with a my disability first, win-lose mentality that in the end is never 
enough to solve the challenges.”). This concern stems from the larger disability rights movement’s origins in a 
number of disability-specific, often competing movements. See generally BAGENSTOS, LAW AND 
CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 12–18 (discussing the history of the disability rights movement). 
267.  E.g., Korn, supra note 17, at 647–48 (proposing elimination of references to “mental and physical” 
disabilities in the ADA with the purpose of eliminating the distinction between the two). 
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backlash from a society that has shown much resistance to accommodating 
psychiatric disabilities.268 
Amending the Civil Rights Act to provide compensatory damages for 
negligent discrimination appears more promising. In fact, courts already use a 
quasi-negligence analysis in their treatment of reasonable accommodation under 
the ADA and harassment by coworkers under all the federal civil rights 
statutes.269 Such a move could provide an effective remedy for victims of overly 
subjective direct-threat assessments, but two decades of inaction since Professor 
Oppenheimer first proposed a negligence theory of employment discrimination 
raises doubts about its political feasibility.270 In addition, even if negligence is 
sufficient culpability to impose damages liability, the negligence standard creates 
a certain temptation to weigh cost against likely harm in determining whether an 
employer was negligent, even when the employer uses workplace policies that 
violate established law under the ADA.271 
C. Harnessing Characteristics of Psychiatric Disabilities in Tort and Other 
Remedies 
Regardless of the merits of amending the ADA or other civil rights statutes, 
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities may be able to assert their rights by another 
avenue: the common law. Mark Weber has recently observed that disability 
discrimination plaintiffs may often have a variety of viable common-law causes 
of action available to them in addition to statutory claims.272 While “race and sex 
discrimination plaintiffs have regularly filed claims asserting violations of 
common law duties,” common-law claims have appeared far less often in 
disability discrimination litigation and scholarship.273 These claims may merit 
more attention from plaintiffs’ attorneys than they currently receive, both for 
disability discrimination plaintiffs generally and for plaintiffs with psychiatric 
 
268.  See id. at 607–09 (noting the common tendency to blame individuals for their psychiatric 
disabilities). 
269.  See Oppenheimer, supra note 160, at 943–44, 946–47 (describing the reasonable accommodation 
mandate in the ADA and harassment jurisprudence under the Civil Rights Act as imposing affirmative duties on 
employers). 
270.  See id. Professor Oppenheimer’s article, published in 1993, has had substantial impact in academic 
circles, with 147 citing references listed on Westlaw as of March 25, 2012. However, only one of these 
references is a primary source, and that citation merely acknowledges the existence of a debate on whether 
unconscious discrimination could constitute disparate treatment. Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 
200 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
271.  See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (analogizing 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA to the Hand formula in tort law); Basas, supra note 147, at 110 
n.260 (criticizing courts’ use of pure cost-benefit analysis in determining the reasonableness of 
accommodations). 
272.  Mark C. Weber, The Common Law of Disability Discrimination, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 429, 430 
(2012). 
273.  Id. at 430, 433–34. 
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disabilities in particular.274 Without necessarily considering psychiatric 
disabilities as a separate class from other disabilities, courts should weigh the 
characteristics of a psychiatric disability as factors in sustaining certain causes of 
action or remedies. The nature and effects of psychiatric disabilities may make 
certain tort actions especially viable in disability discrimination cases.275 
The United States Supreme Court has already signaled a willingness to  
distinguish mental illness from other disabilities on the basis of its unique privacy 
concerns.
276
 In Heller v. Doe, the Court upheld a state law establishing a higher 
burden of proof in civil commitment of people with “mental illness” than of 
people with “mental retardation.”277 The Court justified its ruling not by the 
classification of the disabilities per se, but by the increased probability of 
diagnostic error for “mental illness” and the heightened privacy concerns of 
people with “mental illness” compared to “mental retardation.”278 Here, the 
distinction between considering relevant characteristics of a disability and 
considering a diagnosis or label per se is critical, because the differences between 
psychiatric and other disabilities may then be considered without splitting off 
psychiatric disabilities as a separate class.279 
Several common-law claims may be particularly appropriate for plaintiffs 
with psychiatric disabilities. This Part explores three specific tort causes of 
action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and (3) wrongful discharge against public policy. It then 
considers the equitable remedy of front pay that is already possible under existing 
antidiscrimination laws. 
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as the “tort of 
outrage,”280 occurs when an actor “by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another . . . .”281 
 
274.  See generally id. at 430–34 (discussing the potential value of common-law claims to disability 
discrimination plaintiffs). 
275.  See infra Part V.C (discussing specific tort causes of action). Although this Comment focuses on 
psychiatric disabilities, similar arguments may apply with equal force to other disabilities, particularly those that 
tend to be invisible unless disclosed. 
276.  See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322–25 (1993) (holding that higher risk of diagnostic error and 
more invasive treatments for “mental illness” than “mental retardation” justified a higher standard of proof for 
civil commitment). 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id. “The mentally ill are subjected to . . . treatment which may involve intrusive inquiries into the 
patient’s innermost thoughts. By contrast, the mentally retarded in general are not subjected to these medical 
treatments.” Id. at 324–25 (internal citations omitted). 
279.  See id. at 326–28 (observing the historical distinction between “mentally retarded” and “mentally ill” 
in English law, but also making clear that the Court’s holding was based on the characteristics of the two 
conditions rather than on common-law tradition). 
280.  74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 37 (2012). 
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The fact patterns in psychiatric disability discrimination cases may well 
support a finding of recklessness. Recklessness requires that the actor “[know] or 
[have] reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize” 
that his conduct creates a substantial risk of harm.282 Even if the employer does 
not subjectively expect to create this risk, actual knowledge of a psychiatric 
disability means actual knowledge of a fact that implies an elevated risk of 
emotional distress.283 
Abuse of a position of power, or actual knowledge that the victim is 
“peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or 
mental condition or peculiarity,” may contribute to a finding that conduct is 
“extreme and outrageous.”284 Because both of these factors are arguably present 
with disability discrimination in employment, Professor Weber suggests that the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is well suited to employment 
discrimination, particularly where the plaintiff is harassed because of a 
disability.285 Courts have held that employment relationships inherently create a 
power disparity with the possibility of abuse,286 and an employee’s disability 
increases that power disparity.287 “Power disparities,” such as those “between a 
worker with a disabling condition and a supervisor or coworkers acting with the 
acquiescence of the supervisor,” strongly support a finding of outrageousness.288 
Several courts have actually sustained intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims based primarily on alleged disability discrimination.289 
In light of the Second Restatement’s express mention of “mental condition or 
peculiarity” as a factor in the outrageousness of conduct,290 the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress may be especially appropriate where the disability 
in question is psychiatric. Abundant evidence demonstrates that individuals with 
 
281.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). The most recent draft of the Third Restatement 
uses virtually identical language, merely changing the word “distress” to “harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012). 
282.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). 
283.  See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing the high likelihood of emotional distress 
resulting from employment discrimination). 
284.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e, f (1965). 
285.  Weber, supra note 272, at 461–62. 
286.  See, e.g., White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (La. 1991) (“[M]any of the cases have 
involved circumstances arising in the workplace. A plaintiff’s status as an employee may entitle him to a greater 
degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a 
stranger.”) (internal citations omitted). 
287.  Weber, supra note 272, at 462. 
288.  Id. 
289.  See, e.g., Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortg., Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1139, 1143–44 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(denying summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff’s supervisor became “distant and hostile” to him 
and subsequently terminated his employment after plaintiff disclosed his AIDS diagnosis); Weber, supra note 
272, at 462–64 (citing other cases in employment, education, and public accommdations settings). But see id. at 
464–65 (citing disability discrimination cases in which courts found the alleged conduct insufficient to raise a 
jury question on outrageousness). 
290.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965). 
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psychiatric disabilities are particularly susceptible to severe emotional distress 
caused by perceived discrimination.291 Courts have noted this phenomenon,292 and 
the Second Restatement even uses a prank played on a victim with a psychiatric 
disability to illustrate what may constitute knowledge that a person is “peculiarly 
susceptible” to some form of emotional distress.293 But even the illustration in the 
Second Restatement understates the impact of perceived discrimination on 
people with psychiatric disabilities: it discusses only the susceptibility to 
emotional distress caused by the underlying disability.294 The Second Restatement 
does not mention the effect of stigma—a significant omission because stigma 
contributes greatly to the resulting emotional distress.295 Courts should weigh 
stigmatization of a psychiatric disability in favor of a finding that the psychiatric 
disability makes a plaintiff “peculiarly susceptible” to emotional distress, and in 
turn a finding that knowledge of the psychiatric disability is knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s susceptibility.296 
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Historically, because of concerns about liability to excessive numbers of 
plaintiffs, courts have generally been reluctant to find that a duty of care exists 
when a plaintiff alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress without 
suffering physical injury or property damage.297 One of the few exceptions in 
which courts recognize a duty of care is the preexisting duty rule, where duty 
derives from a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.298 
 
291.  See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing the high likelihood of emotional distress 
resulting from employment discrimination). 
292.  See, e.g., Williams v. Tri-Counties Metropolitan Transp. Dist., 958 P.2d 202, 205 (Or. Ct. App. 
1998) (observing that “bias-motivated conduct . . . inflicts distinct emotional harms” and and is more likely to 
be outrageous than “other forms of antagonistic behavior.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
293.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f, ill. 9 (1965) (asserting that a defendant may be 
liable for IIED for burying “a pot with other contents” to publicly humiliate a person who “has the delusion that 
a pot of gold is buried in her back yard, and is always digging for it. . . .”). 
294.  Id. 
295.  See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text (explaining the link between perceived stigma and 
emotional distress). 
296.  In many cases, plaintiffs will likely need to actually make this argument. The inference that 
discrimination is particularly harmful for people with stigmatized disabilities is, in spite of empirical evidence, 
not universally acepted. See Link et al., supra note 190, at 1622 (noting that “[s]ome reports downplay the 
importance of stigma” and that “strong skepticism” still exists about the effects of stigma on people with mental 
illness). 
297.  JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 153–54 (4th ed. 2010). A small minority of 
states have extended a duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs. Id. at 147 (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 
443, 446 (Tenn. 1996), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that negligent infliction of emotional 
distress should be treated as any other negligence case). 
298.  E.g., Burgess v. Super. Ct., 831 P.2d 1197, 1204 (Cal. 1992) (holding that physician-patient 
relationship created an independent duty of care). 
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Courts have not considered an employment relationship alone to be sufficient 
to give rise to a preexisting independent duty. Most jurisdictions that have 
considered the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in the 
employment context have analyzed duty using the “zone of danger” and 
“bystander” rules, both of which rarely, if ever, apply to disability discrimination 
because they require conduct creating a risk of physical injury.299  
However, courts in several jurisdictions have held that claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress are cognizable in the employment setting if 
serious emotional distress is sufficiently foreseeable—essentially an 
“employment plus particular foreseeability” formulation of preexisting duty.300 
Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp. illustrates this principle.301 The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant employee’s drug screening program caused 
him emotional distress by having a representative directly observe him 
urinating.302 The First Circuit, applying Louisiana law, held that the defendant 
employer had a duty to take reasonable precautions against causing severe 
emotional distress in the administration of its drug screening program where 
severe emotional distress was foreseeable.303 
Other courts have, without necessarily articulating a specific test for duty, 
left open the possibility of allowing negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claims in the employment setting.304 At least one court has sustained a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff alleged harassment 
and termination on the basis of disability.305 
 
299.  Perodeau v. Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 770 n.26, 771–72 (Conn. 2002) (listing cases from other 
jurisdictions analyzing duty in the context of an employment relationship). 
300.  E.g., Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 849 F.2d 41, 43–44 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying 
Louisiana law, holding that employer had a “duty to use reasonable care in implementing and administering its 
drug program so as not to cause serious emotional distress” where emotional injuries exceeding “minimal worry 
and inconvenience” were foreseeable); Faulkner v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (M.D.N.C. 
2008) (holding that an employer may be liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress if it “should have 
realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress”); Dirksen v. Springfield, 
842 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that an allegation of retaliation for EEOC charge is sufficient 
to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Strong v. Terrell, 195 P.3d 977, 982–83 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that negligent infliction of emotional distress is a cognizable claim in the employment 
setting and that duty is determined by foreseeability of harm). 
301.  849 F.2d 41. 
302.  Id. at 43. 
303.  Id. at 43–44. 
304.  E.g., Photias v. Graham, 14 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131–32 (D. Me. 1998) (declining to categorically hold 
that defendant coworker had no duty, stating that further development of facts would be necessary); Wasson v. 
Sonoma Cnty. Jr. College Dist., 4 F. Supp. 2d 893, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that workers’ compensation 
laws did not bar a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim where the employer’s conduct violated public 
policy and implying that such a claim may also be sustainable where an employer’s conduct “exceeds the risks 
inherent in the employment relationship.”). 
305.  Tomick v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No. CV06408944, 2010 WL 2196576 at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 23, 2010). The court found that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness required 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. at *4, but also found that a triable question of fact existed on 
whether the defendant’s conduct created “an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress.” Id. at *3. 
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The Third Restatement of Torts calls for extending duty to “specified 
categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct 
is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”306 This approach somewhat 
resembles that of the courts that have found a preexisting duty under an 
“employment plus particular foreseeability” formula.307 
Even under the Third Restatement’s approach, the way that plaintiffs frame 
psychiatric disability discrimination is critical. Because employment is generally 
at-will, and employers are entitled to arbitrarily fire employees so long as they do 
not do so for specifically unlawful reasons,308 courts are likely to accept the 
premise that discharge or suspension of employees is a normal and expected part 
of employment.309 However, a plaintiff might also frame the employer’s activity 
as something more specific: direct threat evaluation for psychiatric disabilities. 
The activity of evaluating a purported direct threat is highly analogous to the 
activity of employee drug screening in Kelley310 and the fact that express legal 
standards exist for evaluation of direct threats311 suggests that the activity is not so 
plaintiff-specific as to reduce duty analysis to foreseeability alone. A court 
should be able to conclude as a matter of law that evaluating the alleged 
dangerousness of a person with a psychiatric disability is an activity that creates a 
special likelihood of serious emotional distress; this would establish a duty using 
the approach endorsed by the Third Restatement and several states.312 
If duty exists, then a plaintiff might establish breach of duty through the 
negligence per se doctrine.313 The employer’s obligations to participate in the 
interactive process to accommodate disability and to objectively assess the 
existence of a direct threat are well established,314 and the foreseeable harms 
 
306.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (2012). Although the 
foreseeability of harm to the specific plaintiff does not factor into this formulation of preexisting duty, the Third 
Restatement nonetheless calls for an inquiry into whether the relationship between the parties and the general 
category of activity in which the defendant is engaging give rise to a particularly high likelihood of serious 
emotional distress. Id. at cmt. f, cmt. i. 
307.  See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing the “employment plus particular 
foreseeability” formulation). 
308.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Rev. 2009). 
309.  E.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We further recognize that 
properly to manage its business, every employer must on occasion review, criticize, demote, transfer, and 
discipline employees.”). 
310.  See supra notes 301–03 and accompanying text (discussing Kelley, 849 F.2d 41). 
311. See supra Part II.B (discussing employers’ affirmative duties in evaluating direct threats). 
312.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. f (2012) 
(discussing courts’ approaches to determining what activities are of such a nature that negligence is “especially 
likely” to cause serious emotional harm). 
313. Under the negligence per se doctrine, a court may “adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 286 (1965). A statute or regulation may be adopted as the standard of care if the statute is intended 
to protect a class of persons including the plaintiff, to prevent the type of harm that actually occurred, and to 
prevent the specific danger that actually caused the harm. Id. 
314.  See supra Part II.B. 
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associated with discrimination undoubtedly include severe emotional distress.315 
A violation of either of these standards could arguably constitute negligence per 
se.
316
 Although it is true that the negligence per se doctrine applies most 
commonly to criminal statutes, the use of a well-established civil statute to 
establish a standard of care is “an intriguing possibility.”317 Justice Brennan, 
dissenting in Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, at least 
contemplated the possibility.318 He argued that federal jurisdiction was 
appropriate for a negligence per se claim based on violation of a federal statute, 
because the question of negligence would depend on whether the petitioner had 
violated the federal statute, and, in turn, on interpretation of the statute.319 In 
making this argument, Justice Brennan must necessarily have assumed that 
conduct violating a statute, but not subject to criminal penalties, could constitute 
negligence per se.320 
At least one commentator has specifically advocated the use of a well-
established civil statute as a standard of care. Laura Rothstein argued that courts 
should find negligence per se based on violations of the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 because, ten years after the passage of the 
statute, reasonable education professionals should be well aware of its 
requirements.321 Professor Rothstein’s argument applies especially well to direct 
threat assessment under the ADA because the employer’s obligations have been 
settled law for well over a decade. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
direct threat exception as requiring an objective, individualized assessment based 
on “reasoned and medically sound judgments”322 has not changed in a quarter-
century.323 
 
315.  See Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
emotional distress is “a predictable, and thus foreseeable, consequence” or even “a probable result” of disability 
discrimination). 
316.  See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 297, at 86–87 (describing factors used to determine whether a 
statute becomes the standard of care). 
317.  Weber, supra note 272, at 457 n.165 (suggesting negligence per se as a possible means of obtaining 
relief in ADA claims lacking an adequate statutory remedy). 
318.  478 U.S. 804, 823 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
319.  Id. 
320.  See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006) (listing penalties for violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
with many types of violations subject only to a civil penalty); Merrell-Dow, 478 U.S. at 830–31 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (describing a statutory enforcement scheme that relies heavily on injunctions and civil seizure of 
products). 
321.  Laura F. Rothstein, Accountability for Professional Misconduct in Providing Education to 
Handicapped Children, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 349, 373–74 (1985). 
322.  Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1987). 
323.  See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (holding that Arline controls interpretation of the 
ADA’s direct threat exception). 
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3. Wrongful Discharge Against Public Policy 
Most U.S. jurisdictions now recognize the tort of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy,324 which imposes liability on employers for discharges 
that violate some clearly expressed public policy.325 Two considerations affect 
whether disability discrimination can give rise to a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. 
First, courts recognizing the cause of action have focused on protection of an 
employee’s activities furthering public policy.326 Courts may resist extending the 
tort of wrongful discharge to cover acts that are not retaliatory in nature.327 
However, “[s]ome courts have a more expansive idea of the public policy tort 
than merely a claim for retaliation, and the Restatement allows for such an 
interpretation.”328 Professor Weber discusses Ward v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., in 
which a federal court in Idaho denied summary judgment on a wrongful 
discharge claim based purely on disability discrimination.329 In Ward, the 
defendant-employer asked the plaintiff whether he was still on medication 
following a surgical procedure, and terminated the plaintiff’s employment when 
the plaintiff responded affirmatively.330 Although it was unclear whether Idaho 
law allowed a wrongful discharge claim to proceed where statute provided a 
remedy, the Ward court found it persuasive that the Idaho Supreme Court had 
implied the viability of such a claim.331 When it first recognized the tort of 
wrongful discharge against public policy, the Idaho Supreme Court had cited, 
among other out-of-state cases, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,332 a wrongful 
discharge case that arose from sexual harassment.333 Although Monge arguably 
involved retaliation rather than purely discriminatory discharge,334 the Ward court 
 
324.  See generally Michael D. Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of the Camel: Extending the 
Public Policy Exception Beyond the Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 LAB. LAW. 371, 371–72 (1997) (giving an 
overview of the trend toward recognizing and expanding the scope of the wrongful discharge tort). 
325.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, rev. 2009). 
326.  See id. § 4.01(a) (stating that an employer is liable for taking action against an employee “because 
the employee has engaged or will engage in protected activity”); Weber, supra note 272, at 457 (observing that 
the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is primarily directed at retaliatory conduct). 
327.  See Weber, supra note 272, at 458 (noting that “some courts” have expanded the tort of wrongful 
discharge beyond retaliation but implying that these courts are in the minority). 
328.  Id. It is unclear how Professor Weber reaches his conclusion about the Restatement because the 
language he cites refers to the employee’s “other activity directly furthering a substantial public policy.” Id. at 
458 n.171. 
329.  Id. at 458, 458 n.174 (citing Ward v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1194–95 (D. 
Idaho 2005)). 
330.  Ward, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1193. 
331.  Id. at 1194 (citing Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977)).  
332. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). 
333.  Jackson, 563 P.2d at 58 (citing Monge, 316 A.2d 549). 
334.  316 A.2d at 550–51 (describing facts that suggest the plaintiff was fired for rebuffing a foreman’s 
sexual advances). 
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pointed out that the facts of Monge also “presumably could have led to a 
statutory sex discrimination claim.”335 
Second, courts are divided on whether the existence of statutory remedies 
always preempts a tort claim for wrongful discharge.336 Courts have generally 
treated the tort of wrongful discharge against public policy primarily as a gap 
filler to enforce statutes that provide no private remedies,337 and have been 
especially reluctant to extend the tort to antidiscrimination statutes.338 However, 
some jurisdictions evaluate whether the legislature intended for statutory 
remedies to be exclusive;339 a few courts have sustained the tort cause of action in 
employment discrimination cases using this analysis.340 Alternately, courts 
inquire into the adequacy of the statutory remedies. These courts either evaluate 
only adequacy as a deterrent against violation of the statute341 or the adequacy of 
the statutory remedies both as a deterrent and as compensation for the victim.342 
Finally, in Ward v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., the court sustained the plaintiff’s 
wrongful discharge tort claim without evaluating the adequacy of statutory 
remedies for disability discrimination.343 
Any of the minority approaches might allow for the tort claim to avoid 
preemption in psychiatric disability discrimination cases. The ADA expressly 
states that it “shall not be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and 
 
335.  Ward, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1194. 
336.  See infra notes 337–43 and accompanying text (discussing cases). 
337.  See, e.g., Van Kruiningen v. Plan B, LLC, 485 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D. Conn. 2007) (stating that “the 
Connecticut Supreme Court intended merely to provide a modicum of judicial protection for those who did not 
already have a means of challenging their dismissals . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); McGarvey v. 
Key Property Mgmt. LLC, 211 P.3d 503, 507 (Wyo. 2009) (stating that “[t]his public policy exception is 
narrow in scope” and requring that the plaintiff show that “there is no other remedy available to protect the 
interests of the discharged employee or society.”). 
338.  Kimberly C. Simmons, Annotation, Pre-emption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of Action by Civil 
Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.5th 1, 22–23 (1994); see also, e.g., Brudnicki v. General Electric Co., 535 F. Supp. 84, 
89 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“In light of these statutory remedies, the Court will not imply an independent cause of 
action in this context.”). 
339.  The Restatement of Employment Law endorses this approach, but observes that courts often decline 
to extend it to public policies articulated by civil rights statutes. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T § 4.01 cmt. d 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, rev. 2009). 
340.  E.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1229–30 (Okla. 1992) (holding that state 
antidiscrimination statute did not evidence intent to abrogate common-law rights and stating that “[t]he growth 
of the common law in the area of master/servant relationship will not be stunned by legislative silence.”). 
341.  Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d 526, 534 (Ohio 2002) (“The mere absence of recovery for 
emotional distress is not enough to convince us that the remedies . . . are somehow insufficient to vindicate the 
policy . . . .”); Martin v. Clinical Pathology Laboratories, Inc., 343 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting a 
tort claim for wrongful discharge because state criminal penalties were an adequate deterrent). 
342.  Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 108 P.3d 437, 445 (Kan. 2004) (holding that the statutory 
remedy was inadequate on the basis of “differences in process, differences in claimant control, and differences 
in the damages available” as compared to tort action); Reddy v. Cascade Gen., Inc., 206 P.3d 1070 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2009) (holding that a statutory remedy is adequate only if the statute provides for such remedies “as are 
needed to make the plaintiff whole,” including compensation for emotional distress). 
343.  392 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1194–95 (D. Idaho 2005). 
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procedures” of any other law “that provides greater or equal protection for the 
rights of individuals with disabilities . . . .”344 This language appears to expressly 
indicate the intent not to foreclose any common-law claims.345 Even if the tort 
claim of wrongful discharge against public policy is based on violation of the 
ADA itself, the tort claim is a state law claim that provides greater remedies for 
the same wrongful conduct, falling squarely within the type of law contemplated 
by the non-preemption clause.346 
Because the privacy implications of litigating a disability discrimination 
claim render purely equitable relief inadequate to compensate plaintiffs with 
psychiatric and other “hidden” disabilities,347 the ADA should not preempt the 
tort of wrongful discharge for these plaintiffs in a jurisdiction that considers 
adequacy for compensation. Unless knowledge of a psychiatric disability was 
already widespread in the plaintiff’s workplace before the discriminatory act, the 
plaintiff cannot be restored to the status quo ante by equitable remedies alone.348 
A court that considers only the adequacy of remedies for deterrence should also 
sustain the tort claim by analyzing more than the remedies’ direct effects on the 
defendant. Where the act of litigating a claim undermines the remedy, and the 
threat of litigation is not credible, the remedy’s deterrent value against workplace 
discrimination is largely illusory.349 
Jurisdictions that have not adopted the approach of inquiring into the 
adequacy of statutory remedies should do so for the sake of enforcing not only 
the ADA but other statutes as well. They should examine adequacy on a case-by-
case basis, and determine whether the remedies can sufficiently compensate the 
plaintiff or whether the remedies could have deterred the defendant’s conduct. 
For many plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities, this inquiry would weigh in 
favor of sustaining the tort claim of wrongful discharge. 
 
344.  42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2006). 
345.  Weber, supra note 272, at 435–36. The U.S. Supreme Court has viewed federal preemption of 
common-law remedies identically to federal preemption of state statutes. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 
U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (holding that the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not preempt 
tort remedies). 
346.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (referring to any law “that provides greater or equal protection for the 
rights of individuals with disabilities”); Weber, supra note 272, at 436 (describing the ADA as “a one-way 
antidiscrimination ratchet”). 
347.  See supra notes 165–81 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of purely equitable 
relief). 
348. Id. 
349.  See Waterstone, supra note 245, at 1854 (arguing that lack of monetary incentive to litigate claims 
has resulted in widespread noncompliance with Title II and Title III of the ADA, which address government 
programs and public accommodations respectively). 
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4.  Front Pay as a Remedy 
The unique situation of plaintiffs with psychiatric and other hidden 
disabilities may justify the award of front pay as an equitable remedy.350 The 
circumstances that justify front pay include “continuing hostility between the 
plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or . . . psychological injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination.”351 To justify front pay, hostility 
must exceed that normally expected from litigation.352 
Litigation related to a psychiatric disability, unlike that for more readily 
visible disabilities, makes the disability known to people who may not have 
previously been aware of it and exposes the plaintiff to stigma.353 This stigma 
may create hostility based on the disability itself, and entirely apart from the 
litigation.354 In addition, the especially strong likelihood that a person with a 
psychiatric disability will suffer psychological injuries as a result of an 
employer’s wrongful conduct weighs in favor of awarding front pay because 
debilitating psychological harm can make reinstatement to a job impracticable.355 
Courts should also take into account the stigma surrounding psychiatric 
disabilities in determining a reasonable period for which to award front pay. In 
determining the amount of front pay to award, courts may consider “a discharged 
employee’s duty to mitigate, the availability of employment opportunities, the 
period within which one by reasonable efforts may be re-employed, the 
employee’s work and life expectancy, the discount tables to determine the 
present value of future damages and other factors that are pertinent on 
prospective damage awards.”356 
A psychiatric disability can easily make re-employment more difficult: the 
disability is especially likely to have been exacerbated by discrimination,357 and a 
person who has litigated a psychiatric disability discrimination suit exposes the 
 
350. See supra note 164(describing front pay and its uses). 
351.  Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). 
352.  Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that front pay was 
appropriate, rather than reinstatement, because the “antagonism between [the parties] rendered reinstatement 
‘not feasible’.”). 
353.  See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure of a disability that 
accompanies litigation). 
354. See supra Part III.A (discussing the stigma associated with psychiatric disabilities). 
355.  See Farley, 197 F.3d at 1339 (affirming award of front pay in part because the plaintiff’s psychiatric 
“symptoms were heavily influenced by” a hostile work environment). 
356.  EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Courts have fairly broad discretion in determining the length of time for which to 
award front pay, so long as the award does not “require unreasonable speculation.” Donlin v. Philips Lighting 
N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 87–88 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in an award of 10 years’ front 
pay). 
357.  See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text (discussing the exacerbation of psychiatric 
disabilities by discrimination). 
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disability to all potential future employers.358 As long as employers tend to view 
job candidates with psychiatric disabilities particularly negatively,359 it is 
reasonable to believe that the plaintiff will take more time to find new 
employment than one with a more visible disability. This inference justifies 
awarding front pay for an extended period. 
D. Toward the Goal of Encouraging Mediation 
Even with monetary damages, litigation would not become the preferred 
option for most individuals who suffer psychiatric disability discrimination, nor 
should it be. Litigation may negatively impact the health of a plaintiff who 
already has a psychiatric disability, even if the plaintiff prevails.360 Where 
mediation is actually available, the advantage of confidentiality makes it 
preferable to litigation for many people with psychiatric disabilities.361 However, 
the potential of monetary recovery makes litigation a meaningful option that 
some aggrieved employees will choose, which, in turn, gives employers a real 
incentive to enter mediation or make good-faith attempts to reach a settlement.362 
The EEOC has a role to play in encouraging parties to opt for alternative 
dispute resolution as well. Even if the difference in rate of referral between 
psychiatric and other disabilities is relatively small, it is statistically significant;363 
the EEOC should work to ensure that stereotypes about psychiatric disabilities do 
not affect its decision-making processes.364 Possible changes might take the form 
of instructions to field offices that the complainant’s perceived ability to 
negotiate should not affect whether the agency refers a case to mediation.365 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In passing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress aimed to 
protect people with a broad range of disabilities from employment 
discrimination.366 However, people with psychiatric disabilities have struggled to 
 
358.  Orme, supra note 166, at 616–17 (discussing courts’ reluctance to allow plaintiffs to sue under 
fictitious names). 
359.  See supra note 110 (citing studies of employer attitudes toward psychiatric disabilities). 
360.  STEFAN, supra note 16, at 15–16; see also Noel, supra note 174, at 406 (making the same argument 
about private enforcement of health insurance parity). 
361.  See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text (discussing how the likelihood of disclosure 
discourages litigation). 
362.  See supra Part IV.B (discussing reasons for employer refusal to participate in alternative dispute 
resolution). 
363.  Moss et al., supra note 200, at 992. 
364.  See supra Part IV.C (discussing bias at EEOC field offices against referring complainants with 
psychiatric disabilities to mediation). 
365. Id. 
366.  See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (2008) 
_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014  9:42 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol.44 
1035 
protect their statutorily guaranteed rights, in part due to an enforcement 
framework that limits remedies for the forms of discrimination that they most 
frequently face.367 The ADA, like other civil rights statutes, allows for 
compensatory damages only for intentional discrimination.368 
Because the lines between disparate treatment and disparate impact are 
blurry, and because courts have been reluctant to find intentional discrimination, 
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are often limited to equitable remedies.369 
As a result, for people who suffer discrimination on the basis of psychiatric 
disabilities, the act of seeking a remedy often undermines the remedy itself by 
revealing the plaintiff’s previously hidden disability.370 This strongly discourages 
litigation371 and, in turn, allows potential defendants to refuse to enter settlement 
negotiations or alternative dispute resolution.372 The strikingly high rate at which 
employers refuse to participate in the EEOC’s mediation program, especially 
when the complainant has a psychiatric disability, suggests that employers 
currently have insufficient incentive to negotiate.373 
Common-law causes of action, which the plaintiff’s bar has strangely 
neglected in disability discrimination cases,374 could provide plaintiffs with a 
compensatory damages remedy to adequately compensate them for harm suffered 
as well as to incentivize good-faith settlement negotiations by defendants.375 This 
Comment has examined specific tort actions that seem particularly appropriate 
for psychiatric disabilities and outlined ways in which the characteristics of 
psychiatric disabilities may realistically justify sustaining these tort actions.376 
Returning to the fictional narrative that began this Comment, John might not 
have been completely denied a remedy had his lawyer considered the possibility 
of pleading tort claims. Because none of the common-law causes of action 
outlined in this Comment require disability-based motives, a court might have 
allowed them to proceed to trial without necessarily finding intentional 
discrimination. Even prior to any litigation, the possibility of tort liability could 
 
(expressly overturning case law that narrowed the definition of “disability”). 
367.  See supra Part III.B–C (discussing the blurring of causes of action in disability discrimination and 
the inadequacy of purely equitable remedies for plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities). 
368. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (describing the ADA’s remedial scheme). 
369.  See supra Part III.B (describing the difficulty that plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities face in 
proving discriminatory intent). 
370.  See supra Part III.C (discussing how equitable remedies are undermined by disclosure of a 
psychiatric disability). 
371.  See supra Part III.D (discussing the deterrent effects against litigation that potential psychiatric 
disability discrimination plaintiffs face). 
372.  See supra Part IV.B (discussing reasons for employer refusal to participate in alternative dispute 
resolution). 
373. Id. 
374.  Weber, supra note 272, at 430, 433–34. 
375.  See supra Part V.A (discussing the need for a consistently available compensatory damages remedy 
in psychiatric disability discrimination cases). 
376.  See supra Part V.C (describing various common-law causes of action). 
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have encouraged John’s employer to accept EEOC mediation or otherwise enter 
into settlement negotiations. Thus, in the absence of statutory changes, the 
common law could offer people with psychiatric disabilities an effective solution 
to the Catch-22 that has kept them from enforcing their rights under the ADA. 
 
